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No  ONE  WOULD  dream of  designing  the  human anatomy  by  discon- 
necting the controls of the left and right sides of the body.  Yet, for the 
most important economic  controls in a modern economy,  monetary and 
fiscal  policies,  economists  today  generally  endorse  the  separation  of 
powers  as a way  of optimizing  noninflationary growth.  What are the 
costs and benefits of coordination and independence  in macroeconomic 
policy?  What are the consequences  of the independence  in policymak- 
ing that has become  firmly rooted in the American polity? Does  policy 
independence  lead to a bias in the mix of monetary and fiscal policies? 
These are the questions addressed in this study. 
One of the major implications of separated powers is seen in the mix 
of monetary and fiscal policies  that is found in major countries  today. 
Policymakers  and economists  in virtually all countries  with separated 
monetary and fiscal policies believe that their countries suffer from fiscal 
deficits and real interest rates that are too high to promote a healthy level 
of private investment  and adequate long-term growth of potential out- 
put. This syndrome of an unfavorable and undesirable monetary-fiscal 
mix has been a feature of the macroeconomic  landscape for more than a 
decade. 
Although there are many explanations  of this endemic  skewness  of 
the fiscal-monetary  mix, this paper considers  the possibility  that deci- 
sionmakers are caught in an interaction that locks them into high deficits 
and tight money.  Fiscal authorities are elected and are reluctant to set in 
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motion a policy that will lead to deteriorating economic  conditions near 
elections  with but modest long-run payoffs.  Monetary authorities typi- 
cally have a longer time horizon, but they also tend to be cautious and at 
times  even  sluggish.  Hence  when  the economy  is locked  into a high- 
deficit equilibrium, a deficit-reduction strategy in the face of slow mone- 
tary reactions may risk a short-run but (for the elected) politically lethal 
economic  slowdown.  Self-interested politicians may therefore consider 
the high-deficit status quo to be the lesser evil. I call this syndrome the 
monetary-fiscal game to reflect the fact that monetary and fiscal policies 
in many large countries are substantially independent and have conflict- 
ing objectives. 
Steps to reduce fiscal deficits must weigh how they will play out in the 
light of the monetary-fiscal game. Where the game is essentially  nonco- 
operative,  the fiscal authorities must guess  at the extent  to which the 
short-run contractionary  impulse  of deficit reduction will be offset  by 
financial markets, exchange rates, domestic  and foreign monetary poli- 
cies,  or a rising tide of private spending. An important example came in 
the United  States,  where  in 1993 the Clinton administration proposed 
and the  U.S.  Congress  enacted  major legislation  to  reduce  the  U.S. 
structural budget deficit by $143 billion when phased in at the end of five 
years. This fiscal package was a high-stakes gamble that productive in- 
vestment  would indeed rise and that the contractionary effect would be 
offset  either by monetary  policy  or by  strong private investment  and 
consumption.  How big a risk was the administration running? To what 
extent could it count on monetary policy to offset the contractionary im- 
pulse of the plan if the economy  turned sour? 
An Analytical Approach to Monetary and Fiscal Coordination 
This essay examines the issues of policy coordination in greater depth 
in two dimensions.  In this section,  I develop  a game-theoretic  model of 
the coordination of domestic fiscal and monetary policy.  This approach 
provides a rich set of possible  outcomes  depending on the degree of co- 
ordination or independence,  on the objectives  of the two players,  and 
on the dynamics.  In the second  part, I put some empirical flesh on the 
analytical bones by examining the likely economic  impact of deficit re- 
duction with different degrees of coordination. William D. Nordhaus  141 
Background 
The  standard treatment  of  macroeconomic  policy  takes  monetary 
and fiscal policy  as exogenous  to the economic  system.  Much current 
analysis characterizes  monetary policy  as a game between  the govern- 
ment and the private sector,  a game that emphasizes  credibility and dy- 
namic consistency.1  In addition, there is an extensive  literature on the 
coordination of policy among nations.2 One school of thought has endo- 
genized  policy  in the analysis  of the "political business  cycle,"  an ap- 
proach that examines  the impact of electoral  forces  on the setting  of 
macroeconomic  policy.3  Although many analyses  consider the partisan 
struggle to win votes and influence macroeconomic  outcomes,4 little at- 
tention has been paid to the nature of the political business  cycle  when 
fiscal and monetary authorities are independent. 
Those  who study fiscal history find that the monetary-fiscal game is 
very much a part of the policy process.  The theory of policy  as devel- 
oped by Jan Tinbergen visualized a unitary policymaker optimizing pol- 
icy in the face of economic  constraints and uncertainties.5 Much writing 
about American fiscal and monetary policy is of a normative bent, as for 
example  the  work  of  Arthur Okun on  "the fiscal-monetary  partner- 
ship.  6  The possibility  of conflicts amongst policymakers  was formally 
analyzed in an early study by Robert Pindyck, which examined the gen- 
eral problem of conflicting objectives  among policymakers.7 The most 
thorough analysis was that of Frederick Ribe, which dealt with the im- 
pact of coordination or lack of coordination on the efficiency  of macro- 
economic  policy.8 Alan Blinder analyzed  issues  of coordination  in the 
case  where policymakers  have two  or three discrete  options  and sug- 
gested  that the game takes the form of a prisoners'  dilemma.9 Alberto 
1.  See,  for example,  Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), Fischer 
(1989), Stokey (1991), and Annunziata (1993). 
2.  A recent overview  is provided in Cooper (1985). Also see Cooper (1968), Oudiz and 
Sachs  (1984), Hamada (1974,  1976), and the extensive  survey  and analysis  of empirical 
macroeconomic  models in Bryant, Holtham, and Hooper (1988). 
3.  See Nordhaus (1975, 1989). 
4.  See particularly Alesina (1987) and Hibbs (1994). 
5.  Tinbergen (1952). 
6.  See Okun (1970, especially  pp. 53-57). 
7.  Pindyck (1976). 
8.  Ribe (1980). 
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Alesina and Guido Tabellini reviewed  the issues  of rules and discretion 
in a noncooperative  framework. 10  A brief discussion  of the issue is also 
found in Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff.  1 
It will be useful to remark on why lack of coordination  may be im- 
portant in practice.  From a macroeconomic  point of view,  macroeco- 
nomic policy can rely on two separate instruments, monetary and fiscal 
policy.  (There are in addition microeconomic  instruments, such as trade 
policy,  the structure of taxation,  or price controls,  but the macroeco- 
nomic  implications  of these  are ignored for the moment.)  As  nations 
have come  to emphasize  the importance of stable prices,  they have in- 
creasingly  highlighted the usefulness  of separating the monetary func- 
tion from the governing fiscal institutions.  The degree of separation dif- 
fers from country to country,  with Germany's  Bundesbank retaining a 
fierce  independence  from the government,  the U.S.  Federal  Reserve 
maintaining independence from the executive  branch, the Japanese cen- 
tral bank being accountable to the Ministry of Finance,  and the Russian 
central bank in the interputsch  period (1991-93) being a toady to the par- 
liament and the military-industrial complex.  Fiscal institutions also dif- 
fer greatly across  countries,  but,  in almost  all democracies,  fiscal au- 
thority is ultimately in the hands of the legislature; where the executive 
is separate from the legislature (as in the United States), there may also 
be a separation of fiscal powers in the government. 
In most developed countries, the central bank takes a stance that em- 
phasizes  austerity  and low  inflation. This central banker's  credo  was 
aptly explained by Arthur Burns shortly after he retired as Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve:  "By training, if not also by temperament,  [central 
bankers] are inclined to lay great stress on price stability, and their ab- 
horrence of inflation is continually reinforced by contacts  with one an- 
other and with like-minded  members  of the private financial commu- 
nity." 12 He contrasted the central bankers' perspective  with that of the 
elected,  fiscal branches: "In fact, much of the expanding range of gov- 
ernment  spending  was  prompted  by  the  commitment  to full employ- 
ment....  'Maximum' or 'full' employment,  after all, had become  the 
nation's major economic  goal-not  stability of the price level."  13 
10.  Alesina and Tabellini (1987). 
1  1.  Dixit and Nalebuff (1991). 
12.  Burns (1979, p. 5). 
13.  Burns (1979, p. 12). William  D. Nordhaus  143 
A Model  of the Fiscal-Monetary  Game 
This  section  presents  a simple model  of the monetary-fiscal  game. 
For the most part, it is a short-run, one-shot game emphasizing the dif- 
ferential impact of fiscal and monetary policies  on inflation, unemploy- 
ment, and the growth rate of potential output. It will be explored in the 
context  of the American economy  and of the domestic  policy  implica- 
tions of fiscal and monetary policies,  but it can be extended  to include 
the international dimensions,  and these will turn out to be an important 
part of the story in the empirical application. In this study, I examine the 
implications of differences in objectives between the monetary and fiscal 
authorities for the conduct and outcome  of macroeconomic  policy; the 
implications  of  differences  in  macroeconomic  theories  are  not  ad- 
dressed here. 14 
The macroeconomic  theory underlying this analysis is most easily ap- 
plied to a closed  economy,  to a large open economy  with a relatively 
small foreign-trade sector, or to a country with fixed exchange rates and 
relatively closed financial markets. It will be noted later that the analysis 
can be applied to virtually all schools  of macroeconomics,  although the 
interpretations will vary according to the specific model.  For concrete- 
ness,  I will show the equations for an economy  in which the monetary 
authority is responsible for monetary policy as represented by the inter- 
est rate, r. (This is treated as the real interest rate in this section,  but the 
analysis  would  apply with modifications  to the nominal interest rate.) 
The fiscal authority is responsible for the structural fiscal surplus ratio, 
S, which measures the government surplus at high employment  divided 
by potential GNP. 15 
14.  Frankel (1988a, 1988b) analyzed the implications of cooperative  and noncoopera- 
tive approaches when policymakers  share the same objectives  but have different models 
of the economy.  Frankel randomly marries policymakers  with one of the eleven  models 
under consideration  and assumes  that the policymaker unblinkingly follows  the prescrip- 
tions of the associated  model. He finds that cooperative  solutions improve the outcome in 
about two-thirds of the cases and show no change or a worse outcome in the balance of the 
cases. 
15.  Yes,  I use GNP, or even better net national product or real national income.  In this 
analysis,  I am interested in the real income and consumption  of U.S.  residents.  Although 
GDP is a useful gauge of U.S.  production, it does not correctly measure the real income of 
Americans. Where possible,  therefore, I stick to the correct measure, national rathe. than 
domestic income. 144  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
For the purposes  of this section,  I consider  a single-period  model. 
The period can be thought of as the time horizon of the fiscal authority, 
which might be an electoral  period. In addition, I assume  that the two 
policy authorities have preferences over the macroeconomic  outcomes, 
inflation (p), unemployment  (u), and the growth of potential output (g). 
To make the analysis  tractable,  I simplify as follows.  First, it is as- 
sumed that both authorities desire levels of unemployment  and inflation 
that are lower than are simultaneously feasible given the inflation-unem- 
ployment constraints. In addition, the fiscal authority has a penchant for 
high deficits because  government  spending and reduced taxes  are the 
meat, potatoes,  and gravy of politics.  The monetary authority has no in- 
trinsic interest  in the government  surplus,  and neither group has any 
intrinsic interest in interest rates. Using these assumptions,  I can write 
the preferences  of the two authorities as 
(1)  UF =  VF(u, p,  g,  S), 
(2)  UM =  VM(u,  p, g), 
where  Uk is the preference or utility level of policy authority k (k equal- 
ing F for the fiscal authority and M for the monetary authority), and Vk 
is the preference function. 
The unemployment rate is the measure of the utilization of resources 
and could equally well be replaced by the ratio of actual to potential out- 
put. Unemployment  is a function of the two policies,  along with other 
predetermined and exogenous  variables, such as the capital stock, tech- 
nology,  and foreign output. 
(3)  u =  u(r, S; ...). 
The dots to the right of the semicolon  in equation 3 are a reminder that 
the model describes  the short run and that many variables are fixed for 
this period. This relationship is a key one in what follows.  The set of poli- 
cies that lead to a given aggregate demand is called the output-equivalent 
policies.  Hence,  the combinations of r and S that lead, say, to an unem- 
ployment rate of 6 percent will be designated in output-equivalent units. 
In this analysis,  assume that both money and fiscal policy matter for 
aggregate demand. It simplifies the exposition  to assume that monetary 
and fiscal policy are perfect substitutes  in their effects  on aggregate de- 
mand and therefore on unemployment in the short run. This characteris- William D. Nordhaus  145 
tic is sometimes  called "the common funnel theorem." To clarify the in- 
essential nature of the common-funnel assumption,  I describe later how 
the results would be modified for different assumptions. 
The model follows  modern inflation theory in assuming that the rate 
of inflation is a function of both the level of resource utilization (the un- 
employment rate) and the expected  rate of inflation: 
(4)  p  = p()  + pe. 
Equation 4 is the medium-run Phillips curve,  where pe  is  the expected 
rate of inflation. It is further assumed that the expected  rate of inflation 
is a mixture of the underlying rate of inflation inherited from the past (a 
backward-looking  component,  pB)  and a forward-looking  component, 
which is represented by the actual rate of inflation: 
(5)  pe  =  wp  +  (1  -  W)pB, 
where w is a parameter. Putting equations 4 and 5 together yields 
(6)  p  = p(u)/(1-w)  + pB,  for I >w0, 
and 
(6')  u =  til,  forw  =  1. 
When w  =  1, this system  reduces  to equation  6' of the new-classical 
macroeconomics  in which  output  and unemployment  are unaffected 
by anticipated monetary or fiscal policies  and, absent shocks,  in which 
the unemployment  rate is always equal to the natural rate of unemploy- 
ment, u'l. 
The final endogenous  variable is the growth rate of potential output. 
In the short run, potential output growth is determined primarily by the 
investment ratio, equal to the ratio of investment to output. The invest- 
ment ratio, in turn, is equal to the private saving ratio plus the govern- 
ment saving ratio, S. To simplify the analysis,  I assume that the private 
saving ratio is unaffected by monetary or fiscal policy,  so that the invest- 
ment ratio is equal to the exogenous  private saving ratio plus S. Hence, 
I can reduce the third target of policy  to a function of the government 
saving rate, g  = g(S). Given time preference and investment opportuni- 
ties, there will be some optimal rate of growth and optimal surplus ratio. 
(Presumably, in line with optimal growth theory, the surplus should not 
be so high that the real rate of return on capital is forever less than the 
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Combining equations 3-6 with equations 1 and 2 yields the preference 
of each agency with respect to the policy variables: 
(7)  U  =  VF{u(r,  S; ... .), p[u(r, S; . .  )]/(1 -  (X)  +  pB,  g(S), S} 
=  UF(r,  S), 
(8)  UM =  Vm{u(r, S; . . .), p[u(r, S;  *. )]/(1 -  w) + pB,  g(S)} 
=  Um(r,  S), 
where  UF and UM  are the implicit preferences  as functions of the policy 
variables. This specification takes the mainstream assumption that w is 
greater than zero. 
For new-classical  assumptions,  u equals u'l  and macroeconomic  poli- 
cies determine the inflation rate, resulting in 
(7')  UF  =  VF[Un, p(r, S; . .  ), g(S), S]  =  UF(r, S), 
(8')  UM =  VM[ul', p(r,  S;  ...  .),  g(S)]  =  UM(r, S). 
Aggregate  Demand  Curves and Bliss Points 
Figure 1 shows  the basic setup. The axes are the policy instruments 
represented  by the fiscal surplus ratio (S) and the real interest rate (r). 
The solid circles  marked "monetary bliss" and "fiscal bliss" represent 
the  most  preferred  constrained  outcomes  (the  constrained  "bliss 
points") of the two policymakers.  In each case,  the point represents the 
maximum of the preference function in either equation 7 or 8 subject to 
the constraints in equations 3-6.  Points to the northeast represent lower 
aggregate demand. The ovals  around the bliss points are each one of a 
family of indifference contours of the designated authority, with points 
inside the contours being preferred to points outside. 
To make the theory operational, I have added a few further assump- 
tions.  The most important is that the preferences  are taken to be qua- 
dratic and separable in the different variables (see the appendix).  A lot 
of algebra or a little reflection shows that the bliss points are really deter- 
mined by two factors,  the optimal level of demand (which affects both 
unemployment  and  inflation)  and  the  optimal  government  surplus 
(which determines the rate of growth and, in the case of the fiscal author- 
ity, the surplus itself). 
In addition, one can represent sets of policies  with the same pressure 
of strength of aggregate demand by a downward-sloping  line. As exam- William  D.  Nordhaus  147 
Figure 1.  Structure of the Monetary-Fiscal Game 
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Note:  Monetary bliss and fiscal bliss represent the most preferred constrained  outcomes  of the two policymakers. 
Each  oval  around the bliss  points  is one  of a family  of  indifference  contours  of the designated  authority,  with the 
points  inside  the contour  being preferred to points  outside  it. M and F lines  show  the combination  of policies  that 
attains  the  most  preferred aggregate  demand  for each.  The  heavy  line  between  bliss  points  is  the  cooperative  or 
contract curve. 
ples, the lines labeled F or M through each bliss point represent the out- 
put-equivalent policies  that give the aggregate demand preferred by the 
fiscal or monetary authority. Put differently, the aggregate demand lines 
through F and M represent those  policies  that produce the authority's 
optimal level of aggregate demand; the M line shows the combination of 
r and S that yields the optimal aggregate demand for the monetary au- 
thority while the F line does that for the fiscal authority. Because  there 
are in effect only two independent targets (the level of aggregate demand 
and the level of the surplus), the bliss points lie at the intersection of the 
aggregate demand lines and the desired level of fiscal surplus. 148  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1994 
In figure 1, the monetary authority has a more contractionary target 
for aggregate demand (reflecting its mission  to contain inflation) along 
with a higher targeted government  surplus (reflecting its desire for high 
output growth and distaste for deficit gravy). The fiscal authority has a 
relatively  expansionary  attitude toward  aggregate demand  (reflecting 
voter aversion to high unemployment and the lag of inflation behind low 
unemployment) and an inclination to run fiscal deficits (to finance every- 
thing from supply-side tax cuts to generous new entitlements).  The anal- 
ysis  below  concentrates  on the pattern of preferences  that is shown in 
figure 1, although from time to time (as in Russia) one finds preference 
reversals and anomalies. 
Cooperative  Equilibrium 
Given the preferences of the two authorities, the macroeconomic  out- 
come will be determined by the extent of cooperation  or independence. 
The first and presumably  happiest case  would be that of cooperation. 
The heavy line between  the bliss points in figure 1 is the contract curve 
showing the locus  of interest rates and fiscal positions  that result from 
joint implementation of monetary and fiscal policies.  Not  surprisingly, 
the cooperative  policies are a compromise between the views of the two 
parties.  It is likely that the government,  which  is the fiscal authority, 
would be the heavyweight  in the discussions  and that the monetary au- 
thority would pretty much follow  the lead of the government.  In this 
case,  the outcome would be close to the fiscal bliss point, with relatively 
high inflation and deficits along with a tendency  to counter recessions 
aggressively  in the short run. 
Noncooperative  Equilibrium 
In most  industrial countries,  monetary  and fiscal  policy  are sepa- 
rated, however,  and the monetary authority is directed to meet specific 
objectives,  particularly price stability. Independent central banks have 
distinct  governing  boards  and  make  decisions  largely  independently 
from the fiscal authorities. This process can be viewed as a two-person, 
non-zero  sum game. Each player, M and F, decides  on its policy taking 
into account the other's policy. For the most part, I will analyze the situ- 
ation as a one-shot  rather than repeated  game,  although a simple dy- 
namic game will be presented shortly. William  D. Nordhaius  149 
Assume  that each  authority behaves  in a noncooperative  manner, 
setting its policies  assuming  that the other's  policies  will not change, 
which leads to the Nash  equilibrium solution.16  The appendix derives 
the major propositions  for the reaction functions  for the case  of qua- 
dratic  utility  functions  using  the  preferences  in  equations  7  and  8. 
Among the results are the following: each of the reaction functions has 
a negative slope; the slope of the monetary reaction function is steeper 
than that of the fiscal reaction function; and the optimal policies (or bliss 
points) are ones  in which the monetary authority has a higher optimal 
fiscal surplus (but not necessarily  a higher level  of real interest rates) 
than the fiscal authority. 
Figure 2 depicts the reaction functions showing how the monetary au- 
thority responds to the fiscal authority and vice versa. Note  that this is 
only an implicit reaction function, however.  Both policymakers  are ac- 
tually responding to the state of the economy  (to inflation, unemploy- 
ment, growth in potential output) and taking the policies of the other pol- 
icymaker  as  given.  The  partner's  policies  are shown  in the  reaction 
function  simply for expositional  reasons  so that one  can solve  for the 
outcome in terms of the actual policies.  In other words, I do not assume 
that the central bank increases  interest rates in response  to the change 
in the fiscal stance; rather, the central bank is responding to the state of 
the economy. 
For the preferences assumed in this study, I reach the surprising con- 
clusion (shown in the appendix) that the monetary reaction function is 
independent of the central bank's preferences  about fiscal policy if both 
parties follow  a Nash  strategy.  This has important implications for an 
evaluation of the central bank's reaction to deficit-reduction packages, 
which will be explored later. 
As mentioned above, figure 2 shows the reaction functions of the two 
players.  The monetary reaction function  coincides  with the aggregate 
demand line of the monetary authority, shown as M in figure 2. For the 
assumed tastes,  the fiscal reaction function is less  steep than the fiscal 
aggregate demand target line (F), and the fiscal reaction function passes 
through the fiscal bliss point. 
16.  The term "noncooperative" is not used in the commonplace  sense that people be- 
have discourteously.  Rather it is used in the technical, game-theoretic  sense that the play- 
ers in the monetary-fiscal game do not generally discuss  their policies  with one another, 
do not agree upon a joint strategy,  and cannot make credible and firm commitments  to a 
course of action. 150  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
Figure 2.  Reaction Functions and Noncooperative Equilibrium 
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Note:  The  monetary  authority'  is  o  n  in  ic  with  its  aggregate  demand  line.  The  fiscal  reaction 
function is flatter than either aggregate demand line. Nash  equilibrium at N  shows  the results of a policy  tug-of-war. 
If the monetary authority announces  a sincere policy rule along M, then the fiscal authority maximizes at R, increasing 
utility for both players. 
Figure 2 also shows the Nash equilibrium, point N, for the monetary- 
fiscal game. The characteristics of the noncooperative  outcome  are dis- 
tinctly familiar and unhappy: 
-The  equilibrium is one in which the deficit is high1er  than the desired 
deficits of either  party. This results from a conflict between the differ- 
ent objectives.  The fiscal authority attempts to lower unemployment 
by  raising the  deficit;  this  is countered  as  the monetary  authority 
raises interest rates to fight inflation; and so forth. At the end of this 
struggle,  because  the two  parties pursue their different objectives, 
the surplus is the big loser. 
-In  the noncooperative  equilibrium, the interest rate is also higher 
than either party would like for analogous reasons.  17 
17.  The first two points are shown by Ribe (1980) in a different model. William D. Nor dhaius  151 
Figure 3.  Inflation and Central Bank Independence 
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Sources:  Grilli, Masciandaro,  and Tabellini (1991) and OECD. 
Note:  In the  fiscal-monetary  game,  greater central-bank independence  leads  to  lower  inflation. This tendency  is 
found across  major industrial countries. 
-One  of the major implications  of the model  is that inflation and, 
temporarily,  unemployment  are  significantly  affected  by  moving 
from a cooperative  to a noncooperative  solution. Figure 1 shows that 
the cooperative  solution lies on the contract curve with an aggregate 
demand outcome  somewhere  between  the fiscal and monetary  au- 
thority's bliss levels.  However,  once the game turns to noncoopera- 
tive Nash,  the level of aggregate demand is determined by the mone- 
tary authority, which is more restrictive and anti-inflationary than the 
fiscal authority. 
This result leads immediately to the proposition that countries with 
independent central banks should have lower inflation than countries 
with dependent  central banks.  Figure 3 shows  the relationship  be- 
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relationship indicates that there is a strong negative  association  be- 
tween  independence  and inflation, as the fiscal-monetary game sug- 
gests.  18 
-In  addition, the model suggests that there should be either no rela- 
tionship or at best a weak negative  relationship between central-bank 
independence  and long-run productivity  growth.  In  the  long  run, 
there will very little or no impact of independence  on the unemploy- 
ment rate because the unemployment rate will be close to the natural 
unemployment rate. There might be some slight negative relationship 
between  central-bank independence  and productivity,  however,  be- 
cause  independence  will,  other things equal,  lead to a higher fiscal 
deficit,  higher real interest rates,  and lower  national saving.  In the 
standard neoclassical  growth model, the lower saving rate will not af- 
fect very long-run productivity growth; but if there are either econo- 
mies  of  scale  or induced  technological  change,  then independence 
might lead to some slight deterioration in productivity growth. Figure 
4  shows  the  relationship  between  central-bank  independence  and 
productivity growth; there is indeed only a weak relationship, but the 
relationship is as predicted slightly negative. 
The model is useful in understanding how the United States got into 
the box of an unfavorable monetary-fiscal mix. According to some ana- 
lysts,  the fiscal-monetary mix was relatively favorable at the end of the 
1950s, with a small fiscal surplus and relatively low real interest rates.  '9 
The tax cuts of 1962-65, by which the Kennedy-Johnson  administration 
expanded the economy  with the main instrument under its control,  led 
to a decrease  in the high-employment  surplus of around 1 percent  of 
GNP. As the Federal Reserve slowly battled the rising inflation, the new 
equilibrium real interest rates ended up higher than they would other- 
wise have been.  Similar episodes  occurred with the Nixon  "New Eco- 
nomic Policy" of 1971 and the Carter stimulus plan of 1977. The clearest 
example of fiscal shock-monetary  response  came with the Reagan sup- 
ply-side policies,  which raised the high-employment  deficit to around 3 
percent of GNP in 1984-86; as the Federal Reserve  pursued its desired 
monetary policy,  real interest rates were 2 to 4 percentage points higher 
18.  See Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), de Haan and Sturm (1992), and Ales- 
ina and Summers (1993). 
19.  According to Schultze  (1992, p. 208), the high-employment  budget (with an infla- 
tion adjustment) was about 1 percent in surplus in 1956-60. William D. Nordhaius  153 
Figure 4.  Productivity and Central Bank Structure 
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Note:  Although  greater central-bank independence  may reduce  inflation, the fiscal-monetary  game  suggests  that 
it will  not benefit  productivity  and may actually  reduce  productivity  growth  if long-run growth  is  sensitive  to  the 
cost  of capital as in new growth theories. 
than they had been in earlier periods. In mid-  1994, with the high-employ- 
ment deficit running around 2 percent of GNP and the economy  near po- 
tential output, real long-run interest rates are 3 to 4 percentage  points 
20 
higher than the historical average over the 1926-80 period.2 
In th  is game, the fiscal policy was often set with an eye to getting the 
economy moving again, while the monetary policy was motivated by the 
need to stop prices from racing any faster. Neither the Federal Reserve 
nor the administrations desired the outcomes  of high real interest rates 
and high budget deficits;  they were  the result of tugs-of-war in which 
each policy authority pursued its objective without being able to control 
the other's decisions. 
20.  For the historical data on real interest rates, see Ibbotson and Brinson (1987). 154  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
An analogous situation has occurred recently in Germany where, af- 
ter German unification, the fiscal authorities did not take steps to offset 
the large demand stimulus. The result was soaring interest rates, with a 
contractionary impact spilling over to the rest of Europe. Again, neither 
the Bundesbank nor the German government desired the high deficit and 
high real interest rates; rather, the unwillingness  of the government  to 
increase  taxes  to pay for unification led to an expansion  of demand, 
which in turn led the Bundesbank to raise real interest rates to ensure 
that inflation was under control. 
A Monetary Rule 
In a repeated game like that concerning the fiscal-monetary mix, the 
participants will surely recognize  that the other has an approach, per- 
haps even a strategy, toward economic  management. Of the two, mone- 
tary policymakers  have  developed  a more  coherent  approach,  while 
fiscal policy  tends to be dictated by elections,  partisanship, personali- 
ties, the power of opposing or blocking coalitions,  and changing fads in 
economic  theory. 
To  recognize  the  likelihood  that the  parties  will recognize  the  re- 
peated nature of the game, assume that the monetary authority has se- 
lected  a clear and publicly  stated approach. Within this framework,  it 
might be to target nominal GNP, which would be equivalent to announc- 
ing that the central bank would keep the economy  on the M line in figure 
2.  Also  assume  that the rule is "sincere,"'" articulated by the central 
bank, understood by the fiscal authority, and completely  credible. 
Figure 2 can then be used  to find the "rule equilibrium." The fiscal 
authority optimizes with respect to the monetary rule, choosing the level 
of the fiscal surplus that leads to the highest attainable level of utility for 
the fiscal authority given the monetary rule. This leads to an equilibrium 
at point R, which can be compared with the Nash  equilibrium at point 
N. Note  that the rule approach leads to the following: 
21.  A "sincere" policy is nonstrategic Stackelberg in which the reaction function coin- 
cides with the player's preferences.  In principle, a "strategic" or "insincere" Stackelberg 
approach could announce a reaction function that would lead the fiscal authority to choose 
the monetary authority's  bliss  point. Rogoff  (1985) analyzes  an insincere  approach in a 
new-classical  economy.  He shows that the outcome  is improved by appointing nonrepre- 
sentative  central bankers whose  tastes  are more anti-inflationary than is the true social 
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-The  outcome is an improvement for both fiscal and monetary parti- 
cipants in that the outcome improves the utility level of both. 
-The  outcome  has a lower government deficit, lower interest rates, 
and therefore higher investment  than the Nash solution. 
-Note  that, in the present setup, a monetary rule improves utility but 
does not affect inflation or unemployment  because  the monetary au- 
thority's  reaction  function  corresponds  to  its  aggregate  demand 
curve. 
One of the most popular themes  in analyzing monetary policy  con- 
cerns  whether  the monetary  authority should follow  firm rules rather 
than discretionary policies.  In traditional monetarist approaches, mone- 
tary rules are a discipline upon the central bank, preventing it from capit- 
ulating to the governing party near elections  or destabilizing the econ- 
omy  through  ill-designed  monetary  steps.  In  the  newer  approaches 
stressing credibility, the monetary authority is viewed  as involved  in a 
game with private-sector  wage and price setters; by announcing a firm 
and credible rule, the monetary authority can establish  a low-inflation 
equilibrium. 
The role of a monetary strategy is quite different in the monetary-fis- 
cal game than in the credibility game with the private sector.  Here, the 
other player is the fiscal authority. By following a firm and credible strat- 
egy, the central bank leads the fiscal authority to an improved fiscal pol- 
icy. The fiscal authority will know that it cannot improve on the central 
bank's output and inflation target, although the fiscal authority can may 
still  dish  up more  deficit  gravy  than the  central  bank  would  desire. 
Hence,  without improving on the inflation and unemployment  record, 
the central bank, by taking leadership in the game, improves the fiscal- 
monetary mix and improves the outcome from the point of view of both 
the fiscal and monetary authorities. At the same time, while more attrac- 
tive than the earlier Nash equilibrium, the rule equilibrium is off the con- 
tract curve and is still not efficient. It has the defect that, while it corres- 
ponds to the monetary authority's preferred level of aggregate demand, 
the deficit is still higher than the monetary authority would desire. 
Dynamics  and the Effects  of Deficit-Reduction  Strategies 
Up to now the emphasis has been on the difference in ultimate objec- 
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arises in a noncooperative  situation when one player reacts cautiously 
or slowly to changes in the economy.  This possibility is examined empir- 
ically in the next section,  and it is useful to lay out the game at this point. 
The difficulty in a dynamic  situation is the following.  Say that the 
economy  starts out in an initial situation with an unfavorable fiscal-mon- 
etary mix and the fiscal authority desires to move to a high-investment 
policy by reducing the deficit with the understanding that, according to 
the monetary rule, monetary expansion  would offset the fiscal contrac- 
tion.22 The rub is that monetary policy  may not react instantaneously. 
Instead,  the monetary authority may want to make sure that the fiscal 
steps are not reversed,  or may be unsure about the economic  reaction 
because  of macroeconomic  controversies,  or may simply want to wait 
until it is sure that the promised slowdown  occurs.  In short, monetary 
policy may not offset the fiscal contraction immediately but might do so 
only with a substantial lag. 
Faced with this delayed reaction, the fiscal authority may decide that 
the economic  cost is too high. Because  it is necessary  to incur some re- 
cession  to get the central bank to offset the fiscal tightening, and because 
of the  short electoral  time horizon facing the elected  fiscal authority, 
they may decide to live with the unfavorable monetary-fiscal mix rather 
than incur recession  as the price to pay for improving the monetary- 
fiscal mix.  To understand the role of dynamics,  extend  the analytical 
model laid out in equations  1-8 with two further assumptions: 
1. Assume that policies  affect the economy  with a one-period lag. 
2. Assume that the fiscal and monetary authorities act as a function of 
the current state of the economy  rather than of forecasts of the future 
state of the economy;  this is called a results-oriented  policy.23 
The timing assumption  (1) is inessential.  The "period" here can be 
taken to be the average lag of the target variables behind the policy vari- 
ables; in most macroeconomic  models, it would be 1  1/2 to 2 years, slightly 
22.  According to Bob Woodward, this was the way President Clinton's economic  ad- 
visers  in 1993 rationalized undertaking the unemployment  risks in deficit-reduction pro- 
gram (see particularly Woodward,  1994, pp. 82-86,  for a pastiche of Alan Blinder's analy- 
sis of deficit reduction). 
23.  There is no good term for this syndrome, and "results oriented" might equally well 
be described as "myopic," "a whites-of-the-eyes  mentality," "forecasting averse," or "act- 
ing in the fog of uncertainty." The point is that for its own reasons the monetary authority 
bases its actions primarily on actual results rather than forecasted or anticipated results. William D. Nordhalus  157 
shorter for output and slightly longer for inflation. Assumption 2 implies 
that there will be a lag in the response of policymaker B to the actions of 
policymaker A as policymaker B waits to see the results of policymaker 
A's policy.  It has the effect  of turning a complex  repeated game into a 
series of one-shot  games.  I return to the rationale and evidence  for the 
results-oriented nature of policymaking in the next section. 
The  dynamic  monetary-fiscal  game  has  the  same  equilibria as  the 
static game analyzed  up to now,  but the dynamics  are quite different. 
Starting at  an  initial  equilibrium,  if  either  fiscal  or  monetary  policy 
changes,  there will be a short-run deviation from the long-run equilibria 
shown in figures 1 and 2. For example,  assume that the fiscal authority 
decides  that it wants  a policy  of lower  fiscal deficits  and reduces  the 
deficit in period 0. This would lead to a contraction  of the economy  in 
period 1. There would be no monetary reaction in period 0 because  the 
economy  would be unaffected,  but the monetary authority would react 
by lowering real interest rates in period 1. This would take the economy 
back to the monetary authority's desired output level  in period 2. The 
fiscal authority might then react with further contraction, leading to high 
unemployment and monetary expansion in period 3, and so on. 
Figure 5 shows  the results  schematically  for the case  where deficit 
hawks  (such  as the Clinton administration in 1993) replace  the deficit 
doves.  The lower fiscal line shows the reaction function associated  with 
the deficit doves while the higher line is that of the deficit hawks. Given 
the dynamics,  the economy  would start at the original Nash equilibrium 
at N*. If the game is played out with a results-oriented monetary policy, 
the economy  would follow the arrows shown in figure 5. After the initial 
deficit reduction,  aggregate demand would fall and the economy  would 
be at point N'.  The monetary authority would react by lowering interest 
rates, moving the economy  to N". Eventually,  the economy  would end 
up at a'higher-saving Nash equilibrium, N**,  but along the way unem- 
ployment would definitely be higher than if no fiscal policy change had 
been undertaken. 
There are a number of alternative approaches that the fiscal authori- 
ties could follow when confronted with a noncooperative  game, results- 
oriented monetary policy,  and time lags in the effects of policy.  Under a 
far-sighted policy,  the government  might enact  a phased  fiscal policy 
that moved very slowly to reduce the deficit. This would not reduce the 
total unemployment but might make the pain more bearable. Or the gov- 158  Brookings Papers oni  Economic Activity, 2:1994 
Figure 5.  Dynamics of Deficit Reduction 
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Note:  Say that deficit hawks  with the upper reaction function  replace  deficit doves  with the lower  one.  Because 
of lags in the economy  and "whites-of-the-eyes"  miionetary  reaction,  the fiscal tightening will be followed  by higher 
than desired unemployment  along the deficit-reduction  path from N* to N**. 
ernment might optimize as shown in figure 2, picking a fiscal stance that 
optimized the government's  utility subject to the central bank's reaction 
function; this stance would lead to an even larger deficit reduction and 
to even higher unemployment  than the Nash equilibria shown in figure 
5. Another interesting possibility  would arise if the government tried to 
reduce the budget deficit in a way that maximized its chances  of reelec- 
tion; the  monetary  policy-constrained  political  business  cycle  would 
have contractionary measures in the early part of the electoral cycle and 
expansionary  policies  timed to boost  the economy  before  the central 
bank had the opportunity to offset them. William  D. Nordhaus  159 
The robust conclusion  for all these  situations is that in the presence 
of time lags and results-oriented  monetary policy,  any noncooperative 
deficit-reduction strategy would tend to raise unemployment in the short 
run as a way of inducing the central bank to play its part in the game. 
Is the (Independence)  Game  Worth the Candle? 
As combatting inflation has come  to dominate macroeconomic  con- 
cerns,  the pendulum has swung toward strong support for an indepen- 
dent central bank. Yet, as I have shown, there may be large losses  from 
noncooperative  policies.  When fiscal-monetary  games turn into fiscal- 
monetary wars, the economy  may diverge sharply from anyone's  pre- 
ferred outcome.  This was shown in figure 2 where the Nash equilibrium 
N is far removed from the contract curve.  Is there any case where de- 
pendence  or capitulation is better than independence? 
What might dependence  mean? In countries  like Japan or Britain, 
which  have  subordinate central banks,  monetary  policy  is conducted 
out of the finance ministry on behalf of the government.  It is assumed 
therefore that monetary dependence  means that monetary policy is set 
by the fiscal authority, which puts the economy  at the fiscal bliss point. 
The opposite  case,  where a coordinated policy would be run by the na- 
tional central bank, is simply unrealistic for most countries,  although 
fiscal policy is sometimes  dictated by the world's central bankers at the 
International Monetary Fund. 
The key question is how the fiscal bliss point compares with the Nash 
equilibrium from the point of view  of the monetary authority. Figure 6 
illustrates this by depicting the indifference contour of the monetary au- 
thority that goes through the fiscal bliss point; call this the capitulation 
contour.  Equilibria inside the capitulation contour are ones  for which 
the monetary authority would prefer a noncooperative  situation, while 
the points outside the contour represent situations where the monetary 
authority would prefer to let the fiscal authority call the tune. 
The main point is that if the Nash equilibrium lies outside the capitula- 
tion contour (as in figure 6), then monetary capitulation is superior to 
independence for both parties. When faced with the situation in figure 6, 
the monetary authority is advised  to declare victory  and withdraw. Of 
course,  in this case,  inflation will be higher than with an independent 
central  bank;  but  the  gains  in  other  objectives,  such  as  economic 160  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
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Note:  Noncooperative  equilibrium with monetary  independence  puts the  economy  at Nash  equilibrium,  N.  The 
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growth, will outweigh the inflationary losses  from the points of view of 
both policymakers. 
When is a capitulation strategy attractive? The divergence  between 
the  cooperative  and  noncooperative  strategies  is  greatest  when  the 
slopes of the reaction functions are nearly equal but the bliss points are 
far apart. This occurs when the fiscal authority has little taste for deficit 
spending and when the major difference  between  the two parties con- 
cerns the optimal inflation or unemployment  rate (see the appendix on 
this point). 
Autres  Temps, Autres Paradigmes 
Finally, I show that this basic story can be applied to a number of dif- 
ferent situations-when  asymmetries are introduced, when open econo- William D. Nordhaus  161 
mies are considered,  and when other macroeconomic  models are exam- 
ined. Most of the results hold up under these alternative approaches, but 
some new wrinkles also appear. Here are a few examples. 
CASE  1. An interesting new twist arises if there are asymmetries  in 
the behavior of the different policymakers.24 Consider an asymmetrical 
response  by the fiscal authority: it is delighted to provide handouts but 
very  reluctant to reduce programs or raise taxes.  In the polar case- 
where  deficits  always  ratchet upward-the  fiscal authority's  reaction 
function has a horizontal line that shoots  out to the left at the existing 
fiscal surplus or deficit. As figure 7 shows,  the equilibrium tends to move 
down  the monetary authority's  reaction curve as deficits increase  be- 
cause of entitlements  or supply-side policies.  In this case,  the fiscal au- 
thority  sets  the deficit while  the monetary  authority reacts  with ever 
higher real interest rates to attain its aggregate demand target. 
CASE  2. Consider the monetarist case in which "only money matters" 
for aggregate demand while fiscal policy  matters only for the composi- 
tion of output.  In this case,  the aggregate demand lines  will have  the 
same shape as in the mainstream variant. If the optimal inflation rate of 
the fiscal authority is higher than that of the monetary authority,  then 
the reaction functions  shown in figures 1 and 2 are unchanged from the 
mainstream case  and all the results hold. As long as the central bank's 
instrument continues  to be the money  supply or interest rates, the re- 
sults are identical to the mainstream model derived above. 
CASE  3. The approach taken above assumes that wages and prices fol- 
low  an accelerationist  Phillips curve  in which  policymakers  can for a 
short time move unemployment away from the natural rate. Even in this 
world there are two major issues  about which the monetary and fiscal 
authority can argue. First, if the elected fiscal authority faces reelection, 
then the fiscal authority may attempt to time policies to ensure a healthy, 
growing, and noninflationary economy  in the period shortly before the 
electoral bell tolls. Therefore,  as long as there is some room to improve 
the state of the economy  in the eyes of the electorate,  the fiscal authority 
may push for popular policies,  which,  rational expectations  notwith- 
standing,25  are still low unemployment  and rapid growth in disposable 
income in the period right before elections. 
24.  This point was suggested by Charles Schultze. 
25.  Much current economic ideology holds that voters cannot be fooled by nonsustain- 
able policies  like tax cuts,  transfer programs, or unsustainably low unemployment.  The 
evidence  does not sustain this view; see Nordhaus (1989) and Hibbs (1994). 162  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
Figure 7.  Equilibrium with Tax-Averse Fiscal Policy 
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Note:  With the growth of entitlements  and antitax sentiments,  fiscal authorities are increasingly reluctant to reduce 
structural deficits,  even  though  new  programs are always  in strong demand.  If there  is  powerful  deficit-reduction 
aversion,  then  the fiscal  reaction  function  bends  to the  left  at the  existing  fiscal  posture,  as  shown  by  the dashed 
lines.  In  this  case,  if  deficits  arise  to  fight  poverty  or  recessions,  the  structural  deficits  rise  from  the  original 
equilibrium at N  to S',  S", S"', and so forth. This leads to a worsening  fiscal policy  and higher real interest  rates as 
the equilibrium creeps  down the monetary reaction function from N to R',  R", R"', and so forth. 
A second  area for disagreement arises from the difference in the in- 
flation targets of the two authorities.  Say that the central bank and the 
fiscal authority agree on the fiscal surplus target. Further assume  that 
unemployment  is at the natural rate and inflation is at the fiscal author- 
ity's  target.  Still,  the  monetary  authority  would  probably  want  to 
squeeze a little more inflation out of the economy,  so there is likely to be 
continued disagreement on the desirable strength of aggregate demand. 
This proposition is clearly supported by the revealed preference of fiscal William D. Nordhaus  163 
and monetary policymakers  in the United  States.  Over the past three 
decades,  it is  hard to  recall  a single  instance  in which  the president 
leaned on the Federal Reserve to increase interest rates, while virtually 
every administration at some point expressed  at least mild concern that 
high interest rates were choking off recovery or causing recession.26 
CASE  4. Consider the new-classical  variant of the model. When antici- 
pated policies  affect inflation but not unemployment,  the aggregate de- 
mand line determines  only the rate of inflation. However,  as in case  1, 
the aggregate demand line will have the same shape as in the mainstream 
variant and the results are the same as in the mainstream case.  The dif- 
ference is that the outcomes are identical for inflation, economic growth, 
and the composition  of output, while there is no effect of policies on un- 
employment.  If the two authorities have the same inflation target, then 
the aggregate demand lines  in figure 2 would  coincide,  and the Nash 
equilibrium would come at the fiscal bliss point and would therefore be 
efficient. 
CASE  5.  Consider next a true classical  model in which money is the 
only  nominally  denominated  exogenous  variable  and  all  prices  and 
wages  are perfectly  flexible.  In this example,  one has a genuine  "dual 
funnel" economy  in which prices are affected only by monetary policy 
and real variables are affected only by fiscal policies.  There is no policy 
conflict  here,  the reaction  functions  are perpendicular,  and the Nash 
equilibrium is efficient.27 
CASE  6. Consider the case of an open economy.  Life becomes  genu- 
inely more complicated here because the interaction between monetary 
policy and exchange rates needs to be incorporated. One important con- 
sideration is the effect  of fiscal policy  on exchange  rates and real in- 
comes.  In the closed-economy  situation,  it was  presumed  that an in- 
crease in domestic  saving ended up in domestic  capital. In a large open 
economy  with flexible exchange  rates, an increase in saving is likely to 
lead to a depreciation of the currency, which in turn will increase saving 
(or decrease  dissaving)  abroad. But the higher growth of net national 
product arising from greater foreign wealth will not translate dollar-for- 
dollar into higher potential consumption because of terms of trade losses 
inherent in the depreciation  of the currency.  In extreme  cases,  higher 
26.  Accounts  of  presidential  consternation  over  tight  money  during the  Johnson, 
Nixon,  and Carter administrations are given in Stein (1984). 
27.  This point was stimulated by a comment of Robert Mundell. 164  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1994 
domestic  saving may actually lead to lower consumption forever, a case 
I call immiserizing saving. 
CASE 7. What would happen if there were a conversion  on the road to 
deficitus wherein the fiscal authority (genuinely) became  as concerned 
about  inflation as  the  monetary  authority?  By  the  end  of  the  Carter 
administration,  the  executive  half of the  fiscal  authority  appeared to 
share the strong anti-inflation propensities of the monetary authority (al- 
though the legislative  half, as usual,  was  strongly averse  to anti-infla- 
tionary fiscal medicine).  In this case,  the aggregate demand lines of the 
two policymakers  would coincide.  The outcome  would then be at the 
common  desired aggregate demand and at the fiscal policy of the fiscal 
authority. In terms of the diagram, the two policymakers share the same 
aggregate demand line but have differing bliss points. Here, because the 
fiscal authority has control over fiscal policy,  the economy  ends up at 
the fiscal bliss point. Note  that there is no policy  conflict here, and the 
need  for  coordination  disappears.  A  similar but  incredible  situation 
would occur if the fiscal authority cared only about the fiscal posture; in 
this case, the fiscal authority would determine the state of the budget and 
the monetary authority would determine output, unemployment,  and in- 
flation. 
Coordination  in Practice 
With this outline of the monetary-fiscal game, the next goal of this pa- 
per is to investigate the actual dynamics of policy and response.  The em- 
phasis in this section is on the monetary reaction to fiscal policies.  It be- 
gins with a vector  autoregression  (VAR)  that maps out the way  that 
policies and outcomes have behaved over the postwar period. I then ex- 
amine  the  difference  between  cooperative  and noncooperative  fiscal 
policies  using the example  of the 1993 U.S.  deficit-reduction package. 
The results of this section  indicate that standard models may overesti- 
mate economic gains if the monetary-fiscal game is ignored and if the po- 
tential losses  through the foreign sector are not included. 
A VAR of Policies  and Outcomes 
It is useful to map out statistically the relationship between the major 
variables to see how targets responded to policies  and how policies  re- William D. Nordhaus  165 
sponded to targets. For this purpose,  I perform a simple VAR for four 
variables: the difference between  the actual and the natural unemploy- 
ment rate (udiff), the rate of consumer price inflation (p), the high-em- 
ployment surplus rate (S), and the nominal federal-funds rate (iff). Fur- 
ther, the Eff  are the coefficients  on the variables in the VAR,  t is time, 
and the Eit  are the shocks or innovations.  In the VAR, the basic structure 
is 
4 
udifft =  E  {aII, udifft,  +  a12v Pt-l  +  a13v St-,  +  aO14  it,f ,} +  EIt, 
1' =  1 
4 
Pt  =  E  {at21, udifft-,  +  aY22VPt-  +  a23v St-  +  a24v  i/tff-}  +  E-,t, 
4 
St =  {ot31,  udifft,,  +  t321, P,_,,  +  0t33v, St_,  +  0t34i,  itf  l,}  +  E3t, 
4 
iftf  =  E  {ot4  1  udifft,-v +  t42v Pt-  V  +  t43v  St-  v  +  Ot44v, i{ti- }  +  E4t. 
v =  1 
These  experiments  are concerned  with  determining  the  extent  to 
which policies respond to the state of the economy  and to other policies 
as well as the extent to which policies are successful  in extinguishing un- 
expected  shocks  to output and inflation. The advantage of the VAR is 
that it is (relatively) agnostic on the controversial  issues of the structure 
of the economy. 
Figures 8 and 9 show the impulse-response  curves for two different 
sample periods,  1955:1-1994:2 and a subperiod of more active monetary 
policy  1979:3-1994:2.  The  first  question  is  how  quickly  unforeseen 
shocks to unemployment  and inflation are eliminated. The figures show 
that  unemployment  is  eliminated  quite  slowly,  with  a  shock  disap- 
pearing in nine quarters for the longer period and about eight quarters 
for the later period of activist  monetary policy.  Inflation is eliminated 
even  more slowly-shocks  to inflation are reduced  to zero only  after 
about six years (not shown).  Within the VAR framework, policy  stabi- 
lizes unemployment,  for a VAR with exogenous  policy has a period for 
extinguishing  unemployment  shocks  of four years; the counterpart of 
better performance  on unemployment  is worse  performance  on infla- 
tion,  as the period for eliminating inflation is shorter with exogenous 
than with endogenous  policy. 166  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
Figure 8.  Vector Autoregression of Policies and Objectives,  1955:1-1994:2 
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Source:  Author's  calculations. 
Note:  Graphs show  the impulse responses  to innovations  of one  standard deviation  for the different variables for 
the sample period  1955:1 to  1994:2. Variables are civilian  unemployment  rate (us), annualized  rate of inflation of the 
CPI  (p),  the federal funds rate (iff),  and the cyclically  adjusted federal budget surplus (S). 
A second question  usefully  addressed  by the VAR is the nature  of the 
reaction  of policy to either  the state of the economy or to other  policies. 
Figures  8 and  9 show the response  of the federal-funds  rate  and  the high- 
employment  fiscal surplus  to the other variables  for the periods 1955:1 
to 1994:2  and 1979:3  to 1994:2,  respectively. To focus first on the re- 
sponse of iff  in both periods, the reactions  clearly show the appropriate 
sign (a positive response to inflation  and negative to unemployment). 
The later  period  in figure  9 shows a quicker  and more  forceful  response 
to unemployment  but a slower and less forceful  response to inflation  af- 
ter 1979. 
Monetary  policy shows virtually no reaction to fiscal policy in the 
figures, confirming  the hypothesis that monetary  policy has been "re- William D. Nordhauis  167 
Figure 9.  Vector Autoregression of Policies and Objectives,  1979:3-1992:4 
0.004  1.0 
0.003  }  Response of S  -Response  of iff 
0.003  %  =  <  z  0 
0.002  -1.0 
0.0 
0.001  - 
-0.5  ~- 
-0.001  l  l  l  l  I  --I  -1.0 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
0.004  to  0.015 
0.003  Response of u 
hoci  u  Response of p 
0.002~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~.1 
0.005 
0.001~  ~  ~~~U'  0.0 
0.000  1 
-  0.005 
-0.002  I  I  I  I  I  -0.010  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1  2  34  567  89  10  1  2  34  56  7  8910 
Quarters  Quarters 
Response to shock in S  ----Response  to shock in iff 
?  --Response  to shock in u  ..-Response  to shock in p 
Source:  Author's calculations. 
Note:  This figure shows  the same variables and ordering as figure 8 for the period of more active monetary policy, 
1979:3 to  1992:4. 
sults oriented" rather than reacting to forecasts of the impact of fiscal or 
other changes on future economic  activity. Finally, note that the federal- 
funds rate responds  relatively  slowly  to both inflation and unemploy- 
ment, a result consistent  with the slow extinguishing of shocks to those 
variables and a potential cause of the noncooperative  equilibrium ana- 
lyzed above. 
Fiscal policy is clearly determined by other factors. The positive rela- 
tion to interest rates may be the effect of interest rates on debt service 
(which is not removed from the structural surplus). Reversing the causal 
ordering had little effect  on the estimated  impulse-response  curves.28 
28.  Figures 8 and 9 assume that the ordering of variables (from most to least prior) is 
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With one exception,  these results are insensitive to the ordering and sub- 
period. The only period when the dynamics look utterly different is the 
monetarist period (1979:3-1983:4).  During this time, the response  to in- 
flation and unemployment was much quicker, with the average lag being 
about two-and-one-half  quarters as  compared  with  an average  lag of 
about five quarters during the rest of the period. 
A final issue  concerns  the possibility  that the analysis  is biased be- 
cause it omits the forward-looking character of financial markets, partic- 
ularly the reaction of equity, bond, and foreign exchange markets to ex- 
pected future economic  conditions.  This possibility can be incorporated 
into the analysis  by including in the VAR  a forward-looking  financial 
variable, which is here taken to be the 10-year Treasury bond rate (iL). 
The modified VAR has exactly  the same lag structure as shown above. 
In the estimation, I assume that the long rate is a purely forward-looking 
rate and a function  of current and expected  future short-term interest 
rates as well as expected  future economic  conditions.  Because  of this 
assumption,  I perform the VAR impulse-response  estimation by having 
iL as the last variable in the causal structure, caused by all the other vari- 
ables. 
Figure 10 shows the results of this new VAR. Its structure is identical 
to the first two VARs in all respects except that it adds the forward-look- 
ing long-term interest rate. The differences in the results that come from 
including the forward-looking component  of financial markets are im- 
perceptible. The impact of monetary policy on unemployment is slightly 
larger than that in figure 8, but the lag structures are essentially identical. 
Upon  examining the determinants of movements  in long-term interest 
rates, it is interesting to note that the major short-term influences come 
from shocks to short- and long-term interest rates, and that, contrary to 
journalistic  wisdom,  shocks  to  inflation have  little  immediate  impact 
upon  long-term interest  rates.  Overall,  this expanded  VAR  indicates 
that the inclusion of forward-looking elements does not change the basic 
results. 
Structural Empirical Modeling  of Coordination  and Independence 
The VAR helps sort out the basic structure but cannot help estimate 
the impact of different strategies  on economic  performance.  For this, 
one needs to return to the Neolithic  Age of Structural Models.  For con- William D. Nordhaus  169 
Figure 10.  Vector Autoregression of Policies and Objectives, with Long-Term Interest 
Rate, 1955:1-1994:2 
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Note:  An alternative approach adds the long-term interest rate (iL)  as a forward-looking,  "caused" variable to the 
earlier structure for the period  1955:1-1994:2.  The  impact of policy  on the major economic  variables and the lag of 
monetary policy  behind economic  shocks  are indistinguishable  from the simpler structure in figure 8. 
creteness,  I use  the U.S.  1993 deficit-reduction  package  as a point  of ref- 
erence.29  The  basic  outline  of  the  1993 deficit-reduction  package  is 
straightforward:  the  1993 budget  act contains  tax and expenditure  provi- 
sions  that  are  projected  to  reduce  the  structural  budget  deficit  by  $143 
billion  between  1993 and fiscal  year  1998. The  reductions  are made  up in 
roughly  equal  parts  of expenditure  reductions  and tax increases. 
29.  The essential fiscal elements of the Clinton economic plan were enacted as the Om- 
nibus Budget and Reconciliation  Act of 1993. A brief discussion,  along with the estimated 
budget impacts that are used here, is presented in Congressional Budget Office (1993). The 
administration's analysis is contained in Economic Report of the President (1994). 170  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1994 
The purpose of the deficit-reduction  package was expressed  clearly 
and simply by President Clinton's Council of Economic  Advisers:  "The 
key macroeconomic  rationale for reducing the Federal deficit is to in- 
crease  investment  and therefore  productivity  and real incomes  in the 
future."30 
This section  examines  the effect  of the Clinton package  under two 
sets of assumptions about monetary policy.  In the noncooperative  mon- 
etary policy,  the Federal Reserve is assumed to respond primarily to the 
state of the economy  in a way consistent  with its reactions over the past 
two decades.  I discuss  below  the exact  specifications  of this policy.  In 
the cooperative  monetary policy,  it is assumed that the Federal Reserve 
takes steps to keep the economy  on the same trajectory as would have 
occurred  without  the deficit-reduction  package.  This policy  is imple- 
mented by targeting a given unemployment  path, although targeting the 
price level or nominal GNP would lead to virtually the same monetary 
I then examine the impact of the deficit-reduction package using three 
different models: a small minimodel developed  for this study,  the Fair 
model developed by Ray Fair, and the well-known DRI macroeconomic 
model of the economy.31  To get at the nub of the issue,  the estimates 
must incorporate two features.  First, the models must either contain a 
sensible monetary reaction function or be manipulable so as to allow one 
to be included.  Second,  the model  should have  endogenous  potential 
output (including earnings on foreign investment)  since the whole point 
of the deficit-reduction game is to increase  investment  and thereby in- 
crease the rate of growth of potential and actual output. Unfortunately, 
no model contains  both of the desired features.  The Fair model has a 
Federal Reserve reaction function but also has exogenous  potential out- 
put. By contrast,  the DRI model has an elaborate supply side with en- 
dogenous potential output, but the monetary sector is modeled as a fixed 
path of nonborrowed reserves  and does not allow for a conventional  re- 
action function.  Given these difficulties, I have developed  a minimodel 
that has both endogenous potential output and a monetary reaction func- 
tion. To use the DRI model, I combined the monetary reaction function 
described  below  (which  treats  the federal-funds  rate as endogenous) 
with the standard DRI model structure (which has exogenous)  nonbor- 
30.  Economic Report of the President (1994, p. 85). 
31.  See Fair (1993) and DRI (1990). William  D. Nordhaus  171 
rowed reserves).  The runs for the Fair model, in which potential output 
is exogenous,  focus primarily on short-run movement  of output around 
its potential. 
Model  Structure 
The underlying specifications  of the three models  are similar. I will 
outline the structure of the minimodel and then discuss  the differences 
between  the minimodel and the other two models.  Potential  domestic 
output,  Q(t), is determined by exogenous  labor force,  L(t), exogenous 
technology,  A(t), and endogenous  capital, K(t): 
(9)  Q(t)  =  A(t)K(t)aL(t)1a 
In what follows,  all lower-case  Greek letters are parameters. Actual real 
GNP, X(t), is determined by three factors: exogenous  forces,  130(t),  fiscal 
policy  measured by the ratio of the high-employment  surplus to poten- 
tial GNP,  S(t),  and endogenous  monetary  policy  represented  by  the 
short-run real interest rate, r(t), at different lags, j: 
(10)  log [X(t)] =  O3(t)  +  E E lj S(t-j)  +  E  2,j r (t-j). 
The unemployment  rate, u(t), is determined by Okun's law: 
(I 1)  u(t) = u'l(t)  -  Ew  j  j[X(t -j)/Q(t -j)  -  1], 
where u"l(t)  is the exogenous  natural rate of unemployment. 
The inflation rate follows  the natural-rate hypothesis: 
(12)  p(t) = E 0  l1  Xp(t  -  1-])  +  E 02j  [u(t -j)  -  U"(01 
where 0k,j are coefficients,  E 0  1j  equals 1, and p(t) is the inflation rate. 
For the minimodel, I drastically simplify the crowding-out process by 
assuming that the government  deficit completely  crowds  out domestic 
investment.  This  corresponds  to  Modigliani's  stock  version  of  the 
crowding-out  hypothesis,  which holds that government  debt displaces 
private capital in the nation's portfolio.32  More precisely,  assume that an 
increase in the net outstanding debt leads to a decrease in the net private 
wealth that is a fraction,  X, of the change in net debt. This assumption 
leads to the following equation for the capital stock: 
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(13)  K(t) =  K*(t) -  XD(t), 
where K*(t)  is the domestic  capital stock without the deficit-reduction 
program, X is the  crowding-out  or capital-displacement  fraction,  and 
D(t)  is the change in the net government debt from the deficit-reduction 
policy.33 
The final issue  concerns  the strategic assumptions  about fiscal and 
monetary policy.  For this experiment,  it is assumed that fiscal policy is 
determined by the complicated  and unpredictable interaction of the ex- 
ecutive  and  legislative  branches.  The  important  assumption  is  that 
changes  in fiscal policy  are exogenous  in that they are independent  of 
the strategy of the monetary authority. The results of the VAR suggest 
that structural deficits are indeed exogenous. 
Monetary  policy,  however,  is taken to be  endogenous.  Again,  as- 
sume that the central bank has a preference function,  VM(u,  p, g). The 
central bank then determines real interest rates by maximizing this pref- 
erence function,  which leads to a reaction function of the following ge- 
neric form: 
(14)  9VM(u,  p, g)lar =  0. 
The most  important assumption  is that monetary policy  is results ori- 
ented and determined by outcomes  rather than by forecasts,  fiscal poli- 
cies,  monetary variables,  or exchange  rates. In this respect,  the model 
falls short of the optimizing central bank, which would use forecasts and 
conjectural  variations  on both  exogenous  and fiscal actions  in deter- 
mining monetary  policy.  Yet,  it is tuned to the  state  of the economy 
rather than some  arbitrary intermediate  objective,  such  as  reserves, 
debt, the money supply, or some monetarist operating rule. 
A full discussion  of the nature of the monetary reaction function is 
not given here.34 Monetary policy  in the United  States  has responded 
to varying influences-election  returns, fads, ideologies,  and economic 
theories-during  the twentieth century, and the coefficients  of the reac- 
tion function  have  varied with these  influences.  However,  the signifi- 
33.  This formulation simplifies by assuming that the deficit-reduction package has no 
effect on investment other than through the impact on the government debt and omits the 
foreign sector. These simplifications will be corrected in the DRI simulations. 
34.  A useful discussion  is contained in McNees  (1986). William  D. Nordhaus  173 
cance  of inflation and unemployment  (or output) comes  through loud 
and clear in past empirical studies.35 
The Minimodel 
The minimodel has been fitted to historical data where that is sensible 
and calibrated to existing models and findings where that seemed  more 
appropriate. The estimation period is 1955:3 to 1994:2 unless otherwise 
noted. The specific equations are derived as follows.  In equation 9, po- 
tential output is estimated using the Okun's law equation  11, assuming 
that the capital elasticity  a- equals 0.25.  Future potential output growth 
is taken from projections by the Congressional  Budget Office (CBO).36 
The parameters of equation 10 are derived from macroeconomic  model- 
ing exercises,  particularly the estimates  of the impact of monetary and 
fiscal  policy  in  work  by  Ralph  Bryant,  Gerald  Holtham,  and  Peter 
Hooper.37 It is assumed that the semilogarithmic multiplier of fiscal pol- 
icy (holding interest rates constant) on real GNP is -  2.0-that  is, a one 
percentage point increase in the ratio of the high-employment  surplus to 
output lowers output by 2 percent. The semilogarithmic multiplier of the 
real short-term interest rate on real GNP is  - 1.0.  Both policies  are as- 
sumed to have a geometrical declining impact with an average lag of five 
quarters. The Okun's law coefficient  in equation  11 is estimated  to be 
2.1.  The inflation equation  is fitted to quarterly data with a single lag. 
The crowding-out  coefficient  in equation  13 is assumed  to be A =  1 in 
light of experience  in the 1980s, while the depreciation rate of the capital 
stock is taken to be 10 percent a year at a declining balance rate. 
Different  approaches  to  the  crucial  monetary  policy  equation  are 
summarized in table 1. The basic structure is that the Federal Reserve 
sets the federal-funds rate adaptively  in response  to the difference  be- 
tween its targeted performance and actual economic  performance. The 
35.  There is a vast literature on the actual and optimal behavior of the monetary au- 
thorities. It is quite rare that empirical macroeconomic  models assume an endogenous cen- 
tral bank. For examples  in macroeconomic  models,  see Fair (1993). For empirical studies 
of Federal Reserve behavior, see Kettl (1986), Goldfeld (1973), McNees  (1986), and Perry 
and Schultze (1993). 
36.  Congressional  Budget Office (1993). 
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Table 1.  Alternative Estimates of Federal Reserve Reaction Function,  1955:2-1994:2a 
OLS,  Polvznomnial 
Independenzt  1979.3-  distribulted  Instrumnenital  OLS, with 
var-iable  OLS  1994:2  lagb  variablec  Forecastd  suirpllus 
Constant  0.002  0.004  0.001  0.002  -0.000  0.002 
Federal-funds  rate,  0.880  0.825  0.882  0.908  0.916  0.880 
one lag  (0.034)  (0.063)  (0.032)  (0.100)  (0.035)  (0.034) 
Unemployment  rate  -0.130  -  0.032  -  0.091  -  0.098  -0.198  -  0.130 
(0.062)  (0.141)  (0.060)  (0.090)  (0.076)  (0.062) 
Inflation rate  0.129  0.222  0.178  0.099  0.147  0.129 
(0.035)  (0.066)  (0.038)  (0.094)  (0.039)  (0.035) 
Surplus  .  .  .  .  .  .  ..  .  .  .  .  ..  .  -0.001 
(0.058) 
R2  0.923  0.897  0.939  0.922  0.923  0.923 
Standard error 
of estimate  0.00983  0.00853  0.00877  0.00985  0.00989  0.00983 
Source:  Author's  calculations. 
a.  The dependent  variable is federal-funds rate (if).  Other variables are the difference between  civilian unemploy- 
ment rate and Robert Gordon's  estimate  of the natural rate of unemployment  (i,diff;  annualized quarterly change in 
the  consumer  price  index  (p);  and high-employment  surplus as  percent  of  potential  output (S);  standard errors of 
coefficients  are in parentheses. 
b.  Lag of two quarters on unemployment  and four quarters on inflation with a quadratic lag function. 
c.  Instruments are udiff(-  1), udiff(-2),  udiff(-3),  udiff(-4),  p(-  1). p(-2),  p(-3),  and p(-4). 
d.  Values of unemployment  and inflation are replaced by two-quarter leading values.  Instruments for future values 
are i,diff,  udiff(-  1), udiff(-2),  idiff(-3),  udiff(-4),  p(-  1), p(-2),  p(-3),  and p(-4).  and iff(-  1). 
durable targets are the unemployment  rate and the inflation rate of con- 
sumer  prices.  I  assume  that  because  of  uncertainties,  political  con- 
straints, and caution, the Federal Reserve  moves  only partially toward 
its inflation and unemployment  objectives.  The sample period is 1955:3 
to 1994:2, and the variables are the nominal federal-funds rate (if]), the 
difference  between  the  civilian  unemployment  rate and Robert  Gor- 
don's estimate of the natural rate (udiff),  and the annualized quarter-to- 
quarter consumer  price index (p), all in natural numbers.38 The coeffi- 
cients for the equation in the first column are reasonable and moderately 
well determined. The equation shows a small increase in the target real 
interest rate as inflation rises and shows lower real interest rates as un- 
employment  rises.  This reaction function threatens to show instability 
because the real interest rate initially declines after inflation shocks,  but 
in practice the lag in the aggregate demand equation is long enough so 
that instabilities do not emerge. 
The  most  notable  feature  of  this  equation  is  that  the  reaction  to 
shocks  is quite slow,  a point foreshadowed  by the earlier VAR experi- 
38.  Gordon (1988). William  D.  Nordhaius  175 
Table 2.  Regression or Forecast Error for Federal-Funds Rate 
Percentage  points per year 
Forecast  errorb 
Regi  essioni 
Period  err-ori  Static  Dynamic 
1993:3  0.06  0.06  -  1.16 
1993:4  -  0.34  -  0.19  -  1.21 
1994:1  0.58  -  0.01  -  1.08 
1994:2  -  0.18  0.44  -  0.51 
RMSE or SEEc  0.965  0.978  2.22 
Source:  Author's  calculations. 
a.  See  VAR from figure 8. 
b.  See  the first equation  in table  1. 
c.  Root mean squared error (RMSE) for forecasts  or standard error of equation (SEE) for estimated equations  (in 
percentage  points). 
ments. The preferred equation in table 1 (that in the first column) shows 
a more rapid reaction of monetary policy  to shocks  than do the VARs 
shown in figures 8-10.  For example,  the median lag for reacting to infla- 
tion is five quarters for the equation in table 1 versus seven quarters for 
inflation in the VARs. 
It might be asked whether either the VAR or the equation tracks what 
appears to be unusually responsive  behavior of the Federal Reserve  in 
the first half of  1994. Table 2 presents  the residuals from the two  sys- 
tems. These results indicate that the behavior in the first half of 1994 was 
not far out of line with earlier periods. Indeed, it appears that monetary 
policy was,  if anything, somewhat  loose  relative to historical behavior 
during the second  half of  1993 and that the Federal Reserve  made up 
about half of the relative looseness  during the first half of 1994. The no- 
tion that the Federal Reserve  in early 1994 moved in a way that was un- 
precedented  is simply unsupported by the reaction functions. 
The second column in table 1 shows the basic equation in the subpe- 
riod of activist monetary policy  (1979:3 to 1994:2). For this period, the 
lag of policy is shorter and policy tends to react more strongly to inflation 
and much less strongly to unemployment.  The third column estimates  a 
polynomial distributed lag on the two target variables, and the resulting 
lag here is somewhat  longer than in the first two columns.  The fourth 
column  shows  an instrumental  variable  estimate  using  lagged  target 
variables as instruments for the lagged dependent variable and current 
target variables.  This estimate  is useful because  of possible  bias in the 
estimate of the lagged dependent variable. The instrumental variable es- 176  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
timate shows  less  well-determined  coefficients  than the ordinary least 
squares  (OLS)  estimates,  but no major change  in the coefficients  ap- 
pears. Not included in table 1 are estimates  corrected for first- and sec- 
ond-order autocorrelation  of residuals,  with and without instrumental 
variables,  which  give  estimated  coefficients  on the lagged dependent 
variable ranging from 0.834 to 0.894, depending upon the exact  specifi- 
cation. 
The fifth column asks whether a forward-looking monetary policy im- 
proves the equation. In this approach, it is assumed that the Federal Re- 
serve  sets policy  on the basis of future inflation and unemployment  as 
forecast  by current and past trends in those  variables.  This approach 
does tend to increase the importance of unemployment  in the monetary 
authority's reaction function,  perhaps because  unemployment  is an in- 
ertial and cyclically  lagging indicator. However,  as was foreshadowed 
by the VAR shown in figure 10, including forward-looking elements does 
not overturn the basic structure. 
Finally, recall that I have emphasized the importance of the presump- 
tion that the Federal Reserve  tends to be "results oriented" rather than 
forecast or model oriented.39  The evidence  speaks firmly in favor of this 
presumption.  One piece of evidence  was in the VARs  shown in figures 
8-10,  which indicated that the federal-funds rate moves gradually in re- 
sponse to shocks to inflation and unemployment.  Another way of seeing 
this is to note that to offset fiscal policy would require a very large move- 
ment of interest rates more or less simultaneous with fiscal shifts. Using 
the consensus  monetary  and fiscal multipliers discussed  above,  a de- 
cline in the fiscal deficit of 1 percent of GNP would require a decline in 
interest rates of around 200 basis  points,  which  is not seen  in reality. 
(The sharp and immediate response  of interest rates needed to offset a 
fiscal  shift is also  shown  in figure 11.) The lack  of responsiveness  is 
clearly seen in the VAR experiments  shown in figures 8-10.  Finally, the 
sixth column in table 1 directly estimates the Federal Reserve's  reaction 
to fiscal changes and finds that the coefficient  on the federal-funds rate 
has the wrong  sign,  although it is thoroughly  insignificant.  Given  the 
standard error of the coefficient,  one can pretty definitely rule out the 
39.  Chairman Alan Greenspan  laid out this philosophy  in testimony  on August  10, 
1994. As reported in "Economy:  Markets May Provide Better Warnings Than CPI on In- 
flation, Greenspan Says,"  Wall Street Journal, August 11, 1994, p. A2. William  D.  Nordhaius  177 
Figure 11.  Reaction of Federal-Funds Rate to Deficit Reduction,  1993:4-1997:4 
Difference of federal-funds  rate  from baseline (percent  per year) 
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Source:  Author's  projections  using models  described  in the text. 
Note:  The  trajectories  of  interest  rate reactions  are quite  different  depending  upon the  monetary  reaction.  The 
simulation estimates  the reaction of the federal-funds  rate under cooperative  and noncooperative  approaches  to the 
1993 deficit-reduction  program beginning in 1993:4. Relative  to the baseline,  an assumption  of fixed reserves  shows 
a  relatively  rapid  reaction  to  change  in  output  compared  with  the  historical  monetary  reaction  function.  The 
coordinated  strategy shows  a sharp drop in the federal-funds  rate, which is necessary  to offset  the forecasted  output 
impact. 
possibility  that monetary policy  responds  immediately  to fiscal policy 
rather than to the state of the economy. 
The "baseline" fiscal forecast was taken from the CBO's baseline pro- 
jection  of September  1993.40 The alternative deficit-reduction  forecast 
was taken to be the deficit reduction as estimated by the CBO. In esti- 
mating the impact, I have assumed that the entire deficit reduction takes 
the form of a reduction in national-defense purchases. Although this was 
not the estimated form of the deficit reduction,  it was in fact the major 
change in the federal budget over the 1990s. In addition, taking the bud- 
get changes as expenditure reductions removes  a number of theoretical 
controversies,  such as Robert Barro's critique and concerns that the in- 
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creases  in tax rates may lead to erosion  of the tax base rather than to 
increase in tax revenues.4' The fiscal package was,  therefore,  a deficit- 
reduction program to lower the primary high-employment deficit by 1.8 
percent of GNP between  1993 and 1998, after which there are assumed 
to be no further changes from the baseline.  The effect on the actual defi- 
cit will be somewhat  different because  of the feedback  of the cyclical 
deficit on the debt.42 
The Fair Model 
A second  approach is to estimate  the impact of the deficit-reduction 
package in the Fair model.  This model is particularly useful because  it 
contains  endogenous  monetary  policy.43 Fair  made  a version  of  his 
model available for these  simulations.  To estimate the impact, I simply 
entered the baseline  and deficit-reduction fiscal proposals  into the Fair 
model with endogenous  monetary policy  and calculated  the impact on 
the economy.44 The Fair model holds potential output exogenous,  how- 
ever,  so that the impact could be measured only on actual output and 
cannot be used to examine the impact on potential output and long-run 
economic  growth. 
The DRI Model 
A third model used here is the macroeconomic  model developed  by 
the forecasting firm DRI. This model is available for personal computers 
along with historical data and projections for 12 years. The estimates be- 
low use the November  1993 simulations; these  projections  are used to 
place the estimates of the impact of policy in the context of views about 
the economy  at the time of the deficit reduction.  The advantage of the 
DRI model is that it contains virtually everything of interest. The disad- 
41.  Barro (1974). 
42.  If the strict Ricardian hypothesis  holds,  then the impact upon aggregate demand 
would be maintained if the deficit reduction took the form of expenditure cuts but would 
be completely  erased if the deficit reduction were tax increases. 
43.  See Fair (1993) for the latest results. 
44.  The monetary reaction function in the Fair model is a more elaborate version of 
the one shown in the first column of table 1. The dependent variable is the nominal three- 
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vantage is that it models monetary policy by assuming that nonborrowed 
reserves  are constant.45 
To implement the DRI model,  I employ the nominal interest-rate re- 
action function shown in the first column of table 1. This integration was 
accomplished  by iterating back and forth between  the estimated  equa- 
tion and the DRI model (with the federal-funds rate held exogenous)  un- 
til the model outcomes  converged  with the estimated interest rate reac- 
tion function. 
For the cooperative  simulations,  models were run so that the unem- 
ployment  rate was unchanged by the introduction of the fiscal policy. 
This was  easily  accomplished  in the minimodel,  but the algorithm for 
solving  the DRI model proved  dynamically  unstable  when  the unem- 
ployment rate was targeted, so it was necessary  to approximate the de- 
sired path. 
Results  of the Simulation 
Table 3 summarizes the impact of a 1993-style deficit reduction in the 
DRI model.  Saving and investment  increase relative to the baseline fis- 
cal policy  for all monetary  strategies,  and all categories  of investment 
benefit. It is interesting to note that in the DRI model the increase in real 
net exports  outweighs  the increase  in domestic  investment.  As will be 
seen below,  this finding has major implications  for the value of deficit 
reduction  because  it raises  the possibility  that the prosaving  policies 
may lead to a decline in consumption for a decade or even longer. 
Figure 11 shows the effect of deficit reduction on the level of the fed- 
eral-funds rate in the DRI model.  Each path is calculated relative to the 
baseline  or pre-1993 fiscal  policy.  This  figure shows  the  cooperative 
path, with sharply declining rates after deficit reduction, along with two 
noncooperative  reaction  functions  (the "DRI: fixed reserves"  and the 
preferred equation in table 1, shown as "DRI: reaction function"). Note 
that the interest rate under the cooperative  policy shows a dramatic and 
immediate drop to offset the fiscal impact; this policy is clearly differen- 
45.  See DRI (1990) for a discussion  of the model's  properties.  Most macroeconomic 
models share with the DRI model the convention  of modeling monetary policy by assum- 
ing that either nonborrowed reserves or the money supply is an exogenous  variable. As is 
seen below,  this convention  tends to produce too much of a reaction of interest rates to 
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tiated both from the other simulations and from monetary policy reality. 
In other runs (not shown),  I investigated  the effects  of the alternative 
reaction functions  shown in table 1. It turns out that there is very little 
difference in the simulated outcome  among the different reaction func- 
tions or between  the Fair model and the minimodel. 
Figure 12 shows the impact of different policies on the unemployment 
Table 3.  Impact of Alternative Policy Strategiesa 
Average for  Difference 
Policy  effect  1993-2004  from  baseline 
(billions  of  (billions  of 
Total GDP  1987 dollars)  1987 dollars) 
Actual 
Baseline  5,943  0.0 
Coordinated  5,977  33.7 
Reaction  function  5,933  -  10.5 
Fixed reserves  5,918  -24.8 
Potential 
Baseline  5,963  0.0 
Coordinated  5,995  31.8 
Reaction  function  5,974  11.0 
Fixed reserves  5,968  4.2 
Real  national  income 
Baseline  5,235  0.0 
Coordinated  5,258  23.6 
Reaction  function  5,221  -  13.5 
Fixed  reserves  5,210  -25.1 
Price level (end of period) 
GDP deflator  (1987=  1.00)  (percent) 
Baseline  1.75  0.0 
Coordinated  1.74  -  1.0 
Reaction  function  1.70  -  3.0 
Fixed  reserves  1.69  -3.8 
Consumption  deflator 
Baseline  1.82  0.0 
Coordinated  1.81  -  0.7 
Reaction  function  1.87  2.9 
Fixed  reserves  1.83  0.2 
(percent  of  (percentage 
Civilian unemployment  rate  labor force)  points) 
Baseline  5.67  0.0 
Coordinated  5.66  -  0.0 
Reaction  function  5.86  0.2 
Fixed  reserves  5.93  0.3 
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Table 3  (continued) 
Average for  Difference 
Policy  effect  1993-2004  from  baseline 
(billions  of  (billions  of 
Composition  of output  1987 dollars)  1987 dollars) 
Consumption 
Baseline  3,904  0.0 
Coordinated  3,912  7.5 
Reaction  function  3,898  -6.0 
Fixed  reserves  3,894  -10.1 
Total private investment 
Baseline  1,084  0.0 
Coordinated  1,130  46.7 
Reaction  function  1,108  24.7 
Fixed  reserves  1,103  19.3 
Equipment 
Baseline  626  0.0 
Coordinated  641  15.5 
Reaction  function  632  6.1 
Fixed  reserves  629  3.5 
Residential  investment 
Baseline  244  0.0 
Coordinated  264  19.6 
Reaction  function  259  15.0 
Fixed  reserves  258  14.0 
Net  exports 
Baseline  -  109  0.0 
Coordinated  -  55  54.0 
Reaction  function  -  62  46.6 
Fixed  reserves  -  67  42.2 
Defense 
Baseline  275  0.0 
Coordinated  200  -  75.4 
Reaction  function  200  -  75.4 
Fixed  reserves  200  -75.4 
Source:  Author's  calculations  using the DRI model,  November  1993 version. 
a.  "Baseline"  uses  the fiscal  policy  before  the  1993 budget  act.  "Coordinated" uses  a Federal  Reserve  reaction 
that  keeps  unemployment  on  the  same  path  as  the  baseline.  The  "reaction  function"  uses  the  nominal  reaction 
function  shown  in the first column  of table  1. The "fixed reserves"  holds the  same nonborrowed  reserves  as in the 
baseline. 
rate  using  the  same  monetary  reactions  discussed  in  the  paragraph 
above.  In addition, it shows  the changes  in the unemployment  rate in 
the other two models. The three models and different reaction functions 
show a similar pattern of response  for the first two years,  after which 
the differences in the reaction functions lead to divergent paths. For all 
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Figure 12.  Unemployment Reaction under Different Strategies,  1993:4-1996:4 
Difference of unemployment  rate from baseline (percent  of labor  force) 
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Source:  Author's  projections  using models  described  in the text. 
Note:  The  unemployment  rate shows  substantial  increases  in response  to the  1993 deficit-reduction  program for 
all noncooperative  approaches compared with the baseline.  The coordinated strategy sets monetary policy to maintain 
the baseline  unemployment  and inflation profile. 
a noncooperative  monetary policy, leads to an increase in the unemploy- 
ment rate of about 0.5 percentage point after two years. 
Figure 13 shows  the impact of the policy on the outstanding federal 
debt. The analysis suggests that, even in the presence of noncooperative 
monetary policy,  deficit reduction does succeed  in stabilizing the debt- 
output ratio. It is interesting to note that the reaction functions  them- 
selves  have a marked effect  on the debt-output ratio; this effect  arises 
because  of the impact of the cumulative cyclical deficits on the debt. 
Effects  on Output, Consumption,  and Real  National  Income 
The proof of the deficit-reduction recipe is in the pudding of higher 
potential consumption or real national income.  Often, analyses of deficit 
reduction examine the defective  measure of GDP. Table 4 shows the cu- 
mulative losses  or gains for different time periods and different models. 
The different models show general agreement about the effects of a non- William D. Nordhalus  183 
Figure 13.  Debt-GDP Ratio Stabilizes with Deficit Reduction,  1993-2004 
Debt-GNP  ratio 
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Source:  Author's  projections  using models  described  in the text. 
cooperative  monetary policy  over the short run. The cumulative  GNP 
loss  from a noncooperative  policy  is between  4 and 6 percent  of one 
year's GNP over a seven-year period. 
Unfortunately,  neither the Fair model nor the minimodel can fully as- 
sess the effect on long-run consumption and real national income,  so for 
these  outcomes  I turn to the DRI model.  An examination  of long-run 
output trends (not shown) indicates that the cooperative  strategy leads 
to a higher cumulative GNP over the period 1993-2004; by contrast, the 
noncooperative  strategies lead to an initially lower GNP followed  by a 
higher GNP after the investments  have begun to pay off in higher poten- 
tial output. It is sobering to see that the noncooperative  strategies do not 
make up the early losses  until more than a decade  after the policy  has 
been implemented.  By the twelfth year after the program, GNP with the 
deficit-reduction  fiscal program is between  11/2 and 21/4 percent  higher 
than the baseline fiscal policy. 
Of course, the point of deficit reduction is not to produce gross output 
but to reduce consumption now so as to increase consumption in the fu- 
ture. Figure 14 shows  the effect  of deficit reduction on cumulative pri- 184  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
Table 4.  Differences in Cumulative GDP from Baseline for Various Models 
Billions  of  1987 dollars 
Model  1993-96  1993-99  1993-2004 
Cooperative  7  62  405 
Noncooperative 
DRI: Fixed  reserves  -  157  -  327  -  298 
DRI: Reaction  function  -  162  -  226  -  126 
Minimodel  -  161  .  . 
Fair model  -  126  . 
Source:  Author's  calculations  using models  described  in the text. 
vate consumption.  (Note  that it excludes  defense,  or public consump- 
tion,  and therefore  overstates  the impact on total consumption.)  The 
cooperative  strategy does succeed in raising cumulative consumption in 
the future.  Surprisingly, the noncooperative  approaches  do not make 
enough improvements  in potential output to offset their harm to actual 
output and consumption over the first 12 years; consequently,  they actu- 
ally lose consumption over the entire period and are still heading down- 
hill by the end of the simulation. 
While private consumption  is close  to the appropriate measure,  it is 
still not the correct measure of domestic  economic  welfare because  it 
excludes  public consumption  (which declines  by $75 billion in the de- 
fense  sector) and does  not properly account  for net capital accumula- 
tion. The most appropriate measure is net national income measured at 
domestic purchasing power; I call this real national income (or RNI). 
To calculate real national income, I take real GNP, subtract deprecia- 
tion,  and then correct  for changes  in the  terms  of trade.  In the DRI 
model, depreciation is calculated as corrected nominal capital consump- 
tion deflated by the GDP deflator. The terms of trade correction adds to 
net national product the difference  between  nominal exports  of goods 
and services  deflated by  the  import deflator and nominal  exports  of 
goods  and services  deflated by the export deflator.46  Real national in- 
46.  In symbols,  say that D is real net output produced and purchased at home,  M is 
nominal imports, X is nominal exports, PM is the deflator for imports, and px is the deflator 
for exports.  Then conventional  net national output is NNP  =  D  +  X/px  -  M/pM. Real 
national income is measured as RNI  =  D  +  X/PM  -  M/pM. The terms of trade losses  are 
the difference between X/px and X/pM. The U.S.  Department of Commerce designates real 
national output measured in this fashion as "command basis" rather than as production 
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Figure 14.  Cumulative Private Consumption,  1993-2004 
Difference in cumulative  consumption  expenditures  from baseline 
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Source:  Author's  projections  using models  described  in the text. 
Note:  Simulation  of  the  DRI  model  indicates  that  cumulative  private  consumption  heads  south  for  all  the 
noncooperative  strategies  and never  recoups  earlier  losses.  Coordinated  policies  have  higher private consumption 
although public consumption  is lower. 
come  is an appropriate national welfare  measure because  it measures 
sustainable consumption rather than sustainable production. It is partic- 
ularly important to examine RNI in cases where a substantial part of the 
effect comes through increased foreign saving induced by changes in the 
terms of trade. 
Figure  15 shows  the impact of the monetary  strategies  on different 
concepts  of national income and output using the DRI model. The three 
strategies shown are, first, one in which the Federal Reserve keeps non- 
borrowed reserves  unchanged; second,  the Federal Reserve's  nominal 
reaction function shown in the first column of table 1; and, third, the co- 
operative  strategy  in  which  unemployment  or  nominal  GNP  is  un- 
changed. In each case,  the value is the difference  in the average value 
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Figure 15.  Gains and Losses from Deficit Reduction,  1993-2004 
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Source:  Author's  projections  using models  described  in the text. 
Note:  Conventional  measures  such as GNP or GDP show  that noncooperative  scenarios  almost  break even  over 
the first 12 years after deficit reduction and that cooperative  policies  have  major gains.  When depreciation  and the 
leakage  from the foreign  savings  bucket  are taken  into account,  real national  income  and consumption  look  much 
less  favorable.  (The figure shows  the average  values  in  1987 prices for the first 12 years  of the simulations  relative 
to the no-deficit  reduction baseline.) 
reduction)  for the period  1993-2004.  The first bar for each  simulation 
shows the average effect on real GNP. The second bar shows the impact 
on real GDP-this  figure matching up with the estimates  given in table 
3. The difference  between  the first two bars is net earnings on foreign 
assets.  Note  that although GDP is the customary measure,  GNP is the 
appropriate measure of income of U. S. residents.  The next bar corrects 
GNP for depreciation, taking into account that GNP contains some dou- 
ble counting and showing  the correction  necessary  to get net national 
product. 
The most appropriate measure is the fourth bar. This measure sub- 
tracts the terms of trade losses  from net national product.  The major 
finding here is that real national income  over the period 1993-2004 de- 
clines for the noncooperative  strategies and makes only a modest gain 
for the cooperative  strategy. One should not be surprised that there are 
terms of trade losses  from deficit reduction because  increased  foreign William D. Nordhaus  187 
investment  requires a depreciation in the real value of the dollar. What 
is surprising is the magnitude of the terms of trade losses,  which  are 
about the same size as the net output gains. The final set of bars in figure 
15 shows total consumption (private consumption expenditures plus na- 
tional defense).  These bars show that all strategies actually reduce total 
consumption over the first 12 years of the program. 
The potentially  detrimental effects  of increased  saving on real na- 
tional income and consumption are called immiserizing saving to paral- 
lel the notion  of "immiserizing growth."47 The idea can be explained 
with a simple growth model and a simple example.48 The simple model 
is as follows.49 Consider a small open economy  with full employment, 
perfect capital mobility, perfect competition,  and no risk or taxes.  Any 
increase  in saving in this case goes into net foreign saving at the world 
interest rate, rf. The equations of the economy  can be written as follows 
(suppressing time where inessential): 
(15)  Q = C  + X-M  + pWfrf, 
where Q is net national product, C is consumption,  X and M are the vol- 
ume of exports and imports (both exclusive  of earnings on investments), 
p is the domestic price of foreign currency and foreign goods,  and p Wf  rf 
is earnings on foreign investments.  (Note  that X and p are used differ- 
ently here than in the rest of the paper.) For simplicity,  assume that do- 
mestic capital is fixed so that, by assumption,  all increased  saving goes 
into foreign investment.  The current account in domestic  output terms 
is CA  =  X  -  M  +  pWf rf. Further suppose  that the absolute  value of 
price elasticities  of imports and exports  are E and y respectively,  that 
trade is initially balanced,  and that initial net foreign assets  are zero. 
Normalize initial X  =  M =  p  =  1, so that initial CA equals zero. 
To increase  saving,  the country  depreciates  its currency,  raising p 
from 1 to (1 +  I),  where P  is small. This will lead to an improved cur- 
rent account by CA =  (E  +  y  -  1)T, and the attempt to increase saving 
increases  actual saving as long as (E  +  y) exceeds  one (the static Mar- 
47.  See Bhagwati (1969). 
48.  A related discussion  is contained  in Oudiz and Sachs  (1984). An analysis  of the 
long-run properties of fiscal policy is contained in McKibbin and Sachs (1991) and McKib- 
bin and Bagnoli (1993). These  studies  do not explicitly  investigate  the impact of saving 
decisions on long-run consumption trajectories. 
49.  A closely  related analysis  of the effect  of fiscal policy  on saving is presented  in 
Obstfeld (1989), who investigates  this issue in a small open economy. 188  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
shall-Lerner conditions).  For simplicity, assume that the increased sav- 
ing is unchanged over time, so that all earnings on increased foreign in- 
vestment  are consumed.  These  conditions  all imply that the change in 
consumption  (call it 8C) from the change in prices will be 
(16)  8C(t) =  -(E  +  'y)T +  Wf(t)rf =  -  (E +  'y)T +  trfCA 
-  {-(E  +  'y) +  trf(E +  y -  1)}T. 
Clearly, consumption  initially declines  because  of the depreciation and 
the deterioration in the terms of trade, but it makes up the difference 
over time from the earnings on foreign assets. 
The present value of the consumption  arising from the saving effort, 
iPV, is simply the present value of equation 16, valued at the consump- 
tion discount rate, p. This is equal to 
(17)  iPV=  f{tr'(E +  -  1)-(E  +  y)}Te-Ptdt. 
0 
For constant interest and discount rates, this is equal to 
(18)  iPV =  T/p [rf(E  +  y  -  1)/p -(E  +  y)]. 
Equation 18 has a number of interesting implications.  To begin with, 
it is obvious  that the sum of the export and import elasticities  (E +  y) 
must exceed  unity for a saving program to succeed.  If the Marshall-Ler- 
ner conditions  do not hold,  then an attempt to increase  foreign saving 
will never get off the ground (the well-known transfer problem). But the 
conditions  under which  increased  foreign  saving  improves  economic 
welfare are even stricter than the Marshall-Lerner conditions.  Assume, 
for example,  that the rate of return on foreign saving is equal to the con- 
sumption discount  rate (rf =  p). In this case,  the term in brackets re- 
duces to  -  1, which shows that the present value of consumption is neg- 
ative.  In other  words,  unless  the  foreign  rate of  return is  above  the 
consumption  discount  rate, the present  value  of a foreign saving pro- 
gram will be negative if the country is not a price taker. 
One might also ask how much the return on foreign saving must be 
above the discount rate for the program to break even.  By equating the 
term in brackets to zero,  the breakeven  condition is found to be rf/p = 
(E +  y)/(E +  y  -  1). The term on the right reflects the terms of trade 
effect and exceeds  unity if the elasticities  are finite. For example,  if the 
sum of export and import elasticities  is three, then the return on foreign William D. Nordhaius  189 
saving must exceed  the consumption discount rate by one-half for a sav- 
ing program to have a positive present value of consumption. 
A simple numerical example  can illustrate this result.  Suppose  that 
a country increases  national saving using a policy  that depreciates  the 
exchange  rate,  increases  competitiveness,  reduces  the volume  of im- 
ports, increases  exports,  and increases  the current account and net for- 
eign investment.  Assume that the increase in net exports comes entirely 
out of consumption.  For concreteness,  assume that the exchange rate is 
passed completely  into prices, that the price elasticity of imports is -  1, 
that the price elasticity  of exports is  -  1.5, and that effects occur with a 
one-year lag.50 Further assume  that the foreign savings are put into in- 
vestments  with a real annual rate of return of 5 percent,  and the con- 
sumption discount  rate is also 5 percent.  For the specific example,  as- 
sume that imports and exports are equal to 1,000 units each and that the 
depreciation is 1 percent. 
Under this assumption, figure 16 shows the effect. The change in rela- 
tive prices induces an increase in real net exports of 25 units, which dis- 
places 25 units of domestic  consumption.  Because  of the terms of trade 
change, the improvement in the current account is only 15 units. The im- 
proved current account leads to an accumulation of foreign assets  pro- 
ducing the "earnings on foreign investment"  shown as an upward-slop- 
ing line in figure 16. The net effect on consumption is shown as the "net 
change in consumption."  This change is negative for a long time, with 
consumption reaching prepolicy levels  only in year 33. 
How  sensitive  are these  results to the model? They hold in the DRI 
model and in the simple example described above.  In addition, with the 
help of Ralph Bryant, I investigated  the potential for immiserizing sav- 
ing using the Brook-I version of the MULTIMOD  model developed  by 
the staff of the International Monetary Fund. This is a large, rational- 
expectations,  classical model of 11 regions, which has been modified by 
Bryant and Charles Soludo.5' The experiments compare a baseline sim- 
ulation  with  a gradual cut  in government  expenditure  in the  United 
States. The results look very much like the DRI simulation. Private con- 
sumption rises less than the cut in government consumption,  so that na- 
tional consumption  (consisting of private consumption and government 
50.  These figures are drawn from the survey in Goldstein and Khan (1985). 
51.  The Bryant simulation and a sketch  of the Brook-I variant contained  in Bryant 
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Figure 16.  Immiserizing Saving 
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Source:  Author's  projections  using models  described  in the text. 
Note:  When an increase in saving goes  into foreign investment,  some of the consumption  reduction gets dissipated 
in  terms  of  trade  losses,  so  the  current  account  improvement  (here  shown  as  15 units)  is  less  than  domestic 
expenditure  switching  (here shown  as 25 units).  It will take many years before consumption  gets back to its starting 
point,  and the present  value  of  the consumption  changes  can easily  be  negative.  The  assumptions  underlying this 
figure are described  in the text. 
purchases) declines over the entire simulation period of 1992-2030. The 
immiserizing-saving paradox seems to strike here as well. 
Second,  using  a  simulation  provided  by  Warwick  McKibbin  for 
the period  1993-2094, I estimated  the impact of U.S.  deficit reduction 
on  U.S.  consumption  in  the  McKibbin-Sachs  model.52  Like  the 
MULTIMOD  model,  this model  is a large,  multiregion,  flexible-price 
approach in which the intertemporal budget constraints and preferences 
are included.  In the McKibbin-Sachs  simulation, again, the impact of a 
phased decrease  in U.S.  government consumption  of 2 percent of GDP 
is calculated.  This model  has short-run effects  similar to those  in the 
MULTIMOD  model,  but total annual U.S.  consumption  does begin to 
rise, although only about 30 years after the deficit reduction. In addition, 
52.  See McKibbin and Sachs (1991). William  D. Nordhaus  191 
Figure 17.  Cumulative Discounted Consumption in Alternative Models,  1993-2090 
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Source:  Author's  projections  using models  described  in the text. 
Note:  The impact on total U.S.  consumption  from a deficit reduction is tested  in two long-term classical  models- 
the MULTIMOD/Brook-l  approach and the McKibbin-Sachs  models.  For both, government  consumption  is reduced 
by  2 percent  of  U.S.  GDP.  The  figure shows  cumulative  discounted  consumption  at each  date for a consumption 
discount  rate  of  5  percent  per  year.  Using  a  present-value  criterion,  the  initial losses  in  consumption  are  never 
recouped  in either model. 
in McKibbin and Sachs,  total undiscounted  U.S.  cumulative consump- 
tion surpasses baseline total consumption by 2057. 
Finally, I calculate the discounted present value of the change in U.S. 
consumption  for the deficit-reduction  package of 2 percent of GDP for 
both the MULTIMOD and McKibbin-Sachs  models.  For these calcula- 
tions, I use a discount rate on consumption of 5 percent a year, which is 
the solution to the Ramsey equation for the parameters of the McKibbin- 
Sachs model and is also equal to the long-run real interest rate in the so- 
lution path for that model. The results are shown in figure 17. This figure 
shows cumulated discounted  consumption for the United States at each 
date. The two models have quite similar trajectories for the first two dec- 
ades. Although cumulated discounted  U.S.  consumption declines in the 
MULTIMOD  throughout the period (simply indicating that total con- 
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discounted  public and private consumption  in McKibbin-Sachs  turns 
upward in 2021, although it does not reach zero within the first hundred 
years. 
These results indicate that the present value of a prosaving policy that 
reduces  government  consumption  is negative for at least a century.  In 
other words, the immiserizing-saving paradox holds for all three models 
for the period considered. 
How sensitive  are these conclusions  to the degree of openness  of the 
economy?  Surprisingly, large open economies  like the United States are 
most likely to face the dilemma of immiserizing saving. Small open econ- 
omies  are  price  takers  in  international  trade.  They  need  very  little 
change in the terms of trade to increase their current account surplus and 
therefore do not incur a large terms of trade penalty from increases  in 
foreign saving.  At the other pole  are large closed  economies,  perhaps 
like the United States a generation ago. For these economies,  all or al- 
most  all domestic  saving goes  into domestic  investment,  so  again no 
terms of trade penalty  is necessary  to increase  ex  post  saving.  In be- 
tween  these  two polar cases  are large countries that suffer a deteriora- 
tion in the terms of trade to achieve a large share of increased saving go- 
ing into  foreign  investment.  Perhaps,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
national return to saving, the United States is in that unfortunate middle 
ground between  very open and very closed. 
It is instructive to compare all these  results with those presented  in 
the  1994 Economic  Report  of the President.  Although  the Council  of 
Economic Advisers (CEA) defends deficit reduction as a way of increas- 
ing investment,  productivity,  and real incomes,  the bottom line is pre- 
sumably potential  consumption  or real income  ai la John Hicks.53 The 
CEA estimates  the impact of deficit reduction using a standard Solow- 
style growth model for its calculation.  It assumes  that the lower deficit 
is divided 60:40 between increased investment and a reduced current ac- 
count deficit. The CEA further assumes  that there is no loss of output, 
which implicitly corresponds to the cooperative  strategy analyzed here. 
The CEA concludes 
53.  Hicks (1939, pp. 173, 178). Recall that Hicks defines income as follows:  "Income 
No.  1 is thus the maximum amount which can be spent during a period if there is to be an 
expectation  of maintaining intact the capital value of prospective  receipts"  and "it equals 
Consumption plus  Capital accumulation." 
This discussion ignores the subtlety of Hicks's discussion  of price changes, interest rate 
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[The  deficit-reduction  plan]  takes about  5 years for the change  in fiscal  policy to 
have a net positive  effect on consumption.  Thereafter,  the effect of the economic 
plan is to raise consumption  permanently,  eventually  by more than  2'/2 percent 
per year.54 
These calculations are much more optimistic than mine. The CEA es- 
timate of the impact on GDP is not far from the DRI cooperative  ap- 
proach. The CEA's estimated impact on consumption  and real national 
income is a rosy scenario even relative to the cooperative  DRI solution. 
The major potential flaws in the CEA  analysis  are not taking into ac- 
count the terms of trade loss that presumably will precede the reduction 
in the current account deficit and assuming a cooperative  policy.  Figure 
17 suggests that the consumption  crossover  point for the foreign sector 
is likely to be much longer than the CEA's hopeful estimate of five years. 
Conclusions 
This  analysis  of  the  monetary-fiscal  game  suggests  that there  are 
many slips between  the cup of deficit reduction and the lip of real na- 
tional income.  It does  not seem  accurate to assume  that the monetary 
authority will offset  the effects  of fiscal policy  in the short run, which 
implies that poorly timed deficit reduction may come at a steep price in 
terms of output and consumption  loss.  Starting from a desired output 
path, a deficit-reduction package is estimated to produce a significant in- 
crease in unemployment  in the short run and is likely to reduce output 
and consumption for at least a decade and possibly much longer. 
All this evidence  suggests  at the very least that, as long as monetary 
policy is results oriented rather than cooperative,  using cyclical  policy 
to reduce the budget deficit in periods of economic  slack is not sensible. 
Of course,  deficit reduction is not designed  to increase unemployment 
in a recession  but rather aspires to raise long-term economic  growth by 
increasing investment.  The results here suggest that a deficit-reduction 
package is likely  to increase  domestic  and foreign  investment.  How- 
ever,  if the policy  is noncooperative,  the contractionary  effect  of the 
package may be to lower consumption,  and the consumption  losses  in 
the early period may never be recouped. 
These results are highly sensitive  to models and assumptions.  I may 
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well have underestimated the gains from deficit reduction if there are ex- 
ternalities  of investment,  particularly investment  in equipment.  If the 
estimated  social return from conventional  production functions  under- 
estimates  the  social  return, the  impact  on potential  output would  be 
higher than otherwise calculated. This modification is unlikely to add up 
to much, however,  because  conventional  estimates  indicate that only a 
small fraction of the lower deficit turns up in higher spending on business 
investment (see table 3). Assuming that the additional equipment has an 
external rate of return (over the private return) of 30 percent a year, the 
additional boost to potential output would be only 1/4  to 1/2  percent of out- 
put at the end of the simulation (as compared to the  1?/2  to 21/4 percent 
increase in GNP from the investment itself). 
These  calculations  are subject to all the reservations  that have been 
noted  above  and should be viewed  as having large potential error be- 
cause  of problems  of misspecification,  uncertainties  about the appro- 
priate  Federal  Reserve  reaction  function,  uncertainties  about funda- 
mental parameters such as the crowding-out fraction and the reaction of 
the exchange  rate, ambiguities that arise from immiserizing saving, and 
controversies  such as those  surrounding the Ricardo-Barro hypothesis 
or the extent of externalities in equipment investment. 
Subject to these  reservations,  four major conclusions  emerge from 
these results. The first is to lend support to those who question the wis- 
dom of deficit-reduction  programs in the face  of high unemployment, 
particularly when the monetary authority is independent,  cautious,  re- 
sults oriented, and highly averse to inflation. Unwelcome  declines in ag- 
gregate demand and increases in unemployment are unlikely to be offset 
by a monetary stimulus in the short run or by a sufficient increase in po- 
tential output in the long run. 
The second  point is the mirror image of the first-that  the potential 
gains from coordination are extremely  high. A coordinated macroeco- 
nomic policy would be one in which the interest rate reaction comes  si- 
multaneously with, and in sufficient strength to offset the contractionary 
impact of, the fiscal contraction.  Whereas an uncoordinated deficit-re- 
duction policy might well lead to lower output and consumption than do- 
ing nothing, a cooperative  approach would allow the nation to reap the 
gains of higher investment  without suffering the losses  of transient un- 
employment.  I estimate that the total gain from coordination for a policy 
like the 1993 deficit-reduction package is on the order of $100 billion to 
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The third and most surprising point is that the nation may fall into the 
immiserizing-saving trap, which occurs when deficit reduction in a large 
open economy  has unfavorable effects  on consumption  because  a large 
share of the increased saving occurs abroad. Under this scenario, when 
increased  domestic  saving leads to a depreciation  of the currency,  the 
reduction in real national income will be greater than the increase in for- 
eign saving. This would not matter for small open economies  (for which 
the terms of trade losses  are trivial) or for large relatively closed econo- 
mies  (for which  most  of the savings  reaction  is domestic).  But some- 
where in between these poles,  and perhaps just where the United States 
lies  today,  is an unfortunate region where  increased  domestic  saving 
could actually reduce the value of consumption forever. 
Finally, as these different strands come together, it becomes  easier to 
see why it is that nations can get caught in a low-savings  trap when they 
play the fiscal-monetary game. The fiscal-monetary game combines fis- 
cal authorities who are soft-hearted,  work in unstable jobs,  and are ex- 
tremely averse to short-run economic  downturns with monetary author- 
ities  who  are  hard-headed,  have  considerable  job  security,  and  are 
highly  averse  to  inflation.  Deficit  reduction  must  be  initiated  by  the 
group with the shortest time horizons,  yet it is likely to produce immedi- 
ate if temporary unemployment  if it is badly timed, and it will definitely 
incur the wrath of the antitax lobby and other affected interest groups. 
The resulting contraction may last for an electoral cycle if the monetary 
authority is sluggish and results oriented. 
The social return to deficit reduction is modest  in the best and most 
cooperative  of worlds; in a noncooperative  world plagued by immiseriz- 
ing saving, deficit reduction may actually make consumers worse off for- 
ever.  Given the tastes  of the players and the meager and uncertain re- 
turns  to  deficit  reduction,  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  major deficit 
reductions like that of 1993 are a rare and endangered species  in today's 
political economy. 
APPENDIX 
Derivation of Reaction Functions 
THE  PURPOSE of this appendix is to derive the reaction functions for the 
case of quadratic preferences in the nonclassical  case (the classical case 196  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
is discussed  in the first footnote to this appendix)." The preference func- 
tions of the two policymakers are given by 
(A1)  UF =  VF(u, p, g, S), 
(A2)  UT =  VM(u,  p, g). 
The paper has shown that because g = g(S), this can be transformed into 
functions of u, p, and S. The functions will be taken to be quadratic and 
separable and can be written as 
(A3)  UF =  -(u  - u*)2  -  r(p  -  p*)2  -y*(S  -S)2, 
(A4)  UM =  -(u  -  u**)2  -  3*  *(p  -  p**)2  -y**(S  -S)2 
where  3 and -y  are parameters. The variables with a single asterisk refer 
to the unconstrained optima for the fiscal authority and those with dou- 
ble asterisks refer to the unconstrained optima of the monetary author- 
ity. By linearizing for the nonclassical  case, the economy  can be written 
succinctly  as 
(A5)  u  =  [LsS  +  r,.r, 
(A6)  p  =  -cxu  +  k=  -ctisS  -  cx[ir  +  k. 
Here, a. and k are parameters, [s and [,. are multipliers of u with respect 
to S and r,  and r is the real interest  rate. Further, from equation  A6, 
a. =  -p'(u)l(1  -  Tr)  >  0, and k  =  pB  +  inessential  constants.  Maxi- 
mizing utility leads to the following first-order conditions: 
(A7)  aUF/aS  =  -2(u  - u*)[5  +  2j*(p  -  p*)oJ[s  -  2y*(S  -  S*)  =  0, 
(A8)  alUM/ar  =  -2(u  -  u**)L,.  +  2j3**(p -  p**)ot  ,. =  0. 
Substituting equations A5 and A6 and reducing yield 
(A9)  (u  -  U*) +  r*(u  -  u+)&t2  +  y*(S  -  S*)/[Ls  =  0, 
(AIO)  (u  -  u**)  +  3**(u  -  u++)cx2  =  0, 
55.  One can derive the new classical  case  as follows:  Replace  equations  A5 and A6 
with p  =  -  [S  S  -  1rr (where Rs and Pr  are the multipliers of inflation with respect to S 
and r and simply use the same notation for expositional  simplicity).  Because  unemploy- 
ment is predetermined, one can set its coefficient equal to zero in the utility function. Solv- 
ing equations A7 and A8 with these new conditions shows that the maximum condition for 
the monetary authority is for p  =  p**,  which shows  that the monetary authority deter- 
mines the inflation rate (rather than aggregate demand in the general case).  If the optimal 
inflation rates coincide,  then S equals S*, which implies that the fiscal authority determines 
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where u  +  and u + + are the unemployment  rates that correspond to the 
desired inflation rates, p* and p**, respectively. 
Solving for the optimal policies for each policymaker,  one obtains 
(All)  [uLsS  +  ,u,r =  [u*  +  3*t2U+  -  Y*(S  -  S*)[Ls]/(1 ?+ r*0L2), 
(A12)  [uLsS  +  ,u,r  =  (u**  +  3**t2u++)/(I  +  1**ot2). 
To simplify, one can, without loss of generality, change units of S so that 
[s =  1;  further  define *  =  1/[1 +  *cx2]and **  =  1/[1 +  **cx2].  This 
yields 
(A13)  S  =  -wrr  + ?*[u*  +  3*cx2u+ -  'y*(S  -  PA, 
(A14)  S =  -  ,u,.r  + 4+**(u**  +  3**t2u  +  +), 
which gives the reaction functions of the fiscal authority: 
(A15)  SF(r)  =  hi[,u,/(1  + 4*y*)]r + 4?*(u*  +  3*t2u+  +  y*S*)/ 
(1 ?  ?*y*)* 
Write the reaction function of the monetary authority as an implicit func- 
tion for transparency: 
(A16)  S  =  -4LrM(S)  +  (**(u**  +  I3**cx2U++) 
Equation A15 is the reaction function  of the fiscal authority,  while 
equation A16 is the reaction function of the monetary authority. The in- 
terpretation is that SF(r) is the surplus set by the fiscal authority as a 
function of the monetary policy and other variables, and rM(S) is the in- 
terest rate set by the monetary  authority as a function  of fiscal policy 
and other variables. The slope of the reaction functions (in terms of the 
change in S per unit change in r) can be determined as follows: 
(A17)  aSFIar =  -  VJIr/[1  +  y-*4*], and 
(A18)  aS/arM  =  -[.. 
Because  -y* and ?*  are both positive  constants,  the slope  of the fiscal 
reaction function in equation A17 is less  in absolute  value than that of 
the monetary authority in equation A18. This relationship is shown  in 
figures 1-6. 
The location of the reaction functions depends on all the parameters. 
The bliss points for each policymaker can be located by finding the inter- 
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tion. For example, for the fiscal authority, the maximum of equation A3 
with respect to both r and S yields the optimal level of aggregate demand 
and the optimal fiscal posture.  By the common-funnel  theorem,  there 
are only two independent targets (aggregate demand and the fiscal sur- 
plus), so these can be perfectly reached by the combination of r and S. It 
is obvious that if the monetary authority has a lower target for aggregate 
demand  (say  because  it has a higher target for unemployment  and a 
lower target for inflation) along with a higher target for the fiscal surplus, 
then its bliss point lies above (although not necessarily  to the left of) the 
bliss  point  of  the fiscal  authority.  Since  each  policymaker's  reaction 
function goes through its bliss point, this shows that the shape of the re- 
action function is as shown in figures 1-6. 
For completeness,  I show  this proposition  for the simplest  case  in 
which it is assumed that all parameters of the preference functions  are 
the same except  that the optimal unemployment  rate of the monetary 
authority is higher than that of the fiscal authority,  so that u** >  11*. 
Evaluating the reaction functions in equations A13 and A14 at S  =  S*, 
and equating all parameters other than u* and u** to the fiscal parame- 
ters, one finds 
(A19)  SF  =  -  ,.r +  ?4*(U*  +  p*t2UI+), 
(A20)  S =  -J,  rm  +  4 *(u**  + r*&u2I  +) 
Because +* is a positive constant, the level of the surplus along the mon- 
etary reaction function in equation A20 evaluated at the same level of r 
is higher  by the amount  +*[u**  -  u*].  This implies that the monetary 
bliss point is above the fiscal bliss point as long as the optimal fiscal sur- 
plus desired by the monetary authority is higher than the optimal fiscal 
surplus desired by the fiscal authority. It is conceivable  that if the central 
bank's most preferred fiscal surplus is extremely high the monetary bliss 
point is above and to the left of the fiscal bliss point. This would indicate 
that the monetary authority has a lower desired real interest rate than 
does the fiscal authority. The same argument can be made to show that 
the reaction functions  are as pictured if the two authorities have equal 
unemployment  targets and the fiscal authority has a higher target infla- 
tion rate than the monetary authority. 
Finally,  note that as long as the monetary authority follows  a Nash 
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mand line-that  is, with that combination of interest rates and fiscal sur- 
pluses that would optimize aggregate demand. Put differently,  the cen- 
tral bank's fiscal preferences  do not affect the central bank's reaction 
function.  This result is easily  seen  in the monetary  reaction function, 
which contains no parameters that reflect the central bank's preference 
concerning the fiscal surplus. Comments 
and Discussion 
Charles  L.  Schultze:  There  are  three  separate,  although  related, 
themes  in William Nordhaus's  challenging and thought-provoking  pa- 
per.  First,  Nordhaus  demonstrates  that under certain  behavioral  as- 
sumptions the fiscal and monetary authorities, acting independently and 
noncooperatively,  will produce an outcome  in which both budget defi- 
cits and real interest rates are higher than either of the two authorities 
want.  Second,  even  when  U.S.  fiscal  authorities  decide  to lower  the 
deficit, the operating rules of the Federal Reserve  are so cautious that a 
substantial amount of transitional unemployment is likely to be created. 
Nordhaus sees the first noncoordination problem as an important cause 
of the postwar drift to higher budget deficits and higher interest rates and 
the second noncoordination problem as a further reason why the politi- 
cal system is so reluctant to correct the resulting skewness  in the fiscal- 
monetary mix. In the final part of the paper, Nordhaus stresses the nega- 
tive  impact on income  and consumption  that comes  from the adverse 
changes  in the terms of trade that accompany  the  higher saving  and 
lower interest rates.  He raises the possibility  that under some  circum- 
stances  the terms of trade effect may be so large that the present value 
of the consumption  stream would be reduced by an increase in national 
saving. In many ways,  this is the most interesting but also the most con- 
troversial part of the paper. I will have time for only a few comments on 
the final part of the Nordhaus paper. 
The First  Theme 
Starting with the first theme,  Nordhaus  convincingly  demonstrates 
the possibility  of a noncooperative  Nash equilibrium producing a fiscal- 
monetary  mix  with  higher  deficits  and  interest  rates  than  anybody 
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wants. But is this what explains the drift toward the skewed fiscal-mone- 
tary mix that we have observed in the United States and Europe? I don't 
think so.  As  the paper points  out,  two  requirements  are necessary  to 
produce the Nordhaus  result.  First, the fiscal authorities must consis- 
tently prefer levels  of aggregate demand higher than those preferred by 
the monetary authority. And second,  the fiscal authorities must not be- 
lieve  that the monetary  authorities  mean business;  so  they  persist  in 
raising the budget deficit above the level they themselves  think is opti- 
mal in futile efforts to impose their own aggregate demand preferences. 
If the two authorities have more or less the same preferences  about ag- 
gregate demand or, even with different preferences,  if the fiscal author- 
ity maximizes  its preferences  subject to the realization that the mone- 
tary  authority  will  not  allow  aggregate  demand  to  exceed  its  own 
preferences,  then the fiscal authority simply picks the deficit it want's 
on structural grounds and the monetary authority sets the level of short- 
term interest rates to achieve its own demand preferences.  End of story. 
There is no counterproductive  Nash equilibrium. 
In recent years,  the major shifts toward a policy  mix of high budget 
deficits and high interest rates occurred in the Reagan-Bush years in the 
United States and the Kohl deficit-financing years of German reunifica- 
tion. From the current and subsequent  statements  of the main players, 
the  initial  1981 tax  and  spending  policies  that  first gave  rise  to  the 
Reagan-era deficits were clearly chosen for structural reasons, not as an 
effort to offset the then prevalent high interest rate policies  of Paul Vol- 
cker's Federal Reserve.  The fiscal authorities got more deficit than their 
rosy  scenarios  predicted,  but that's  not relevant to the point at hand. 
Later on, during the long recovery from the 1982 recession,  as real inter- 
est rates were pushed up to historic highs by the Federal Reserve,  there 
were numerous efforts, some that met with small success  and some with 
no success,  to reduce the budget deficit, but I don't  see  any evidence 
of additional fiscal expansion  undertaken to counter unwanted demand 
restriction by the Federal Reserve. 
Although Nordhaus  does  not refer to it, the recent German experi- 
ence tells much the same story. For political and structural reasons,  the 
Kohl government decided to finance the costs of reunification with East 
Germany without  a tax increase.  The Bundesbank  reacted  to prevent 
overheating by raising interest rates. But there is nothing in the record 
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ernment to counteract the Bundesbank's  demand restraints. In neither 
of these two recent cases  did a signfiicant component  of the sharply in- 
creased deficits and real interest rates appear to arise from efforts by the 
fiscal authorities, along the lines of Nordhaus's  figure 2, to offset the re- 
strictive  policies  of  the  central  bank  with  further  doses  of  fiscal 
expansion. 
There is another scenario,  quite similar to that posed  by Nordhaus 
but with slightly different dynamics, that might be invoked to explain the 
development  of the fiscal-monetary mix in the United States during the 
postwar years prior to the Reagan era. In most recessions  or early recov- 
eries,  the executive  branch and Congress either distrusted the Federal 
Reserve's  willingness  or did not believe  in its ability to  stimulate the 
economy  through monetary policy.  Expansionary fiscal measures were 
consequently  adopted, allegedly of a temporary nature. Because  of po- 
litical inertia, at least some of the deficit-raising measures became per- 
manent, forcing the Federal Reserve,  as recovery  proceeded,  to raise 
interest  rates to a level  higher than at the peak of the prior business 
cycle.  Because  of this lack of coordination,  or better yet because of this 
distrust, we ended up with an increasingly undesirable fiscal-monetary 
policy mix by a ratchet-like procedure. The only problem with this story 
is that it doesn't quite fit the facts. In the first place, there was no upward 
drift in real interest rates prior to the 1980s. Second,  if one uses as a mea- 
sure of fiscal looseness  the inflation-adjusted high-employment  deficit, 
the small average surplus in the 1950s was indeed converted  to a small 
average deficit in the 1960s and 1970s. But that deficit exhibited only a 
tiny upward trend until the Reagan era began. In short, there may have 
been a small, but certainly not a substantial, long-term drift for the worse 
in the monetary-fiscal policy mix in the years before 1980. 
The Second  Theme 
Nordhaus  poses  a second  type of coordination  problem arising not 
because  of any conflict over ultimate aggregate objectives  but from the 
very sluggish and outcomes-oriented  operating rules of the Federal Re- 
serve.  His view of these rules can be summarized: "Don't fire until you 
see the whites of their eyes  and even  then use only rifle bullets and no 
heavy artillery." As a consequence,  when the fiscal authorities do sum 
up the courage to cut the deficit they are faced with substantial transition 
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Nordhaus  proceeds  by fitting a very simple equation describing the 
reaction function of the Federal Reserve  and combines  it with the DRI 
model, and several others, including one of his own, to simulate the tran- 
sition  losses  presumably  following  the  Clinton  deficit-reduction  pro- 
gram. These turn out to be quite substantial. 
Several  caveats  are in order about this conclusion.  Within the DRI 
framework that Nordhaus  uses,  serious  questions  can be raised about 
the realism of Nordhaus's  reaction function,  or any simple linear rela- 
tionship based on a few variables. The equation that Nordhaus ends up 
using for his main simulation contains only two independent variables, 
the  NAIRU-adjusted  unemployment  rate and the  inflation rate.  The 
equation is fit from 1955:1 through 1994:2. But that allows for none of 
the major regime changes that monetary policy has passed through over 
the years,  although his formulation  would  not capture those  changes 
anyway.  The second column of his table 1 shows  the result if the equa- 
tion is fitted to the Volcker-Greenspan  era (from 1979 to date). Here the 
coefficient on the unemployment rate is virtually zero, implying the Fed- 
eral Reserve  no longer reacts to shifts in unemployment.  If Nordhaus 
had used that version in his simulations,  the transition losses  would un- 
doubtedly have been much larger than he reports. 
In fact, what the results in the second column almost surely reflect is 
the period of the early and mid-1980s when Volcker  first ratcheted up 
interest rates to wring out inflation despite  high and rising unemploy- 
ment. And then starting after a brief respite in late 1982, the Federal Re- 
serve began to anticipate the potential consequences  of the surging bud- 
get deficits and the falling national saving rate by pushing up real interest 
rates to historically unprecedented  levels  very early in the fledgling re- 
covery  when unemployment  was still exceedingly  high. It did not wait 
for higher inflation to appear before acting. Starting in May 1983, with 
unemployment still at 10 percent and inflation substantially reduced, the 
Federal Reserve  pushed up the federal-funds rate over 250 basis points 
over the next  15 months.  In the early 1980s, it did set monetary policy 
on a reasonable forecast of the economic consequences  of enacted budg- 
etary legislation. 
In a related vein,  most  recessions  prior to the latest  one were  im- 
portantly driven by  the actions  of a Federal  Reserve  determined  not 
merely to halt a rise in inflation but to achieve  a significant reduction in 
the level of inflation. As a consequence,  the Federal Reserve  was in no 
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The Nordhaus reaction function reflects this history. Even if the Federal 
Reserve  were unwilling to anticipate the transitional consequences  of 
deficit tightening, it is not obvious they would react as slowly to the sub- 
sequent rise in unemployment  as they did during the early stages of the 
past recession. 
One final point on this subject.  Since  the Clinton deficit-reduction 
program was enacted,  the short-run performance of the economy  could 
scarcely  be improved.  Employment  gains have  accelerated,  and most 
observers think the economy  has now reached or closely  approached its 
potential. I find it hard to fault the Federal Reserve up to this point. Yet, 
if one takes the Nordhaus simulations with their monetary reaction func- 
tion at face value, one is forced to conclude that the growth of the econ- 
omy in the absence of deficit reduction would have threatened overheat- 
ing and a rise in inflation. Ironically,  in this view,  the only  thing that 
could have rescued us from the excessively  easy baseline  policy being 
followed  by the Fed was the perfect timing of the administration's con- 
tractionary fiscal policy.  Ah, you say, but the game isn't over yet. The 
recent moves  to monetary tighteness  may throw the economy  into the 
kind of unemployment  envisaged  in the Nordhaus  simulation. Possibly 
true, but if that happens the Federal Reserve  clearly will not be blamed 
for sluggishness  and an insistence on waiting for outcomes before acting 
but for an excessive  willingness  to act in advance on forecasts  of infla- 
tion and overheating that hadn't yet arrived. 
Finally,  in Nordhaus's  DRI simulations,  the reader should be aware 
that the large size of the losses  owing to the absence of policy coordina- 
tion are partly due to his ambitious definition of coordination-namely, 
perfect  stabilization  of the unemployment  rate,  with  the  Federal  Re- 
serve beginning to act only as the fiscal action goes into effect.  Because 
the lags in the effect of monetary policy  are longer than the lags in the 
effect  of changes in defense  spending,  the Federal Reserve  has to pro- 
ceed  in a strong "yo-yo"  movement,  alternatively  lowering  and rais- 
ing the federal-funds rate by large amounts. That is undoubtedly the rea- 
son  why  Nordhaus  reports that the DRI  model  "proved  dynamically 
unstable when the employment rate was targeted," forcing the use of an 
approximation by hand. And even then, by early 1995, one of the swings 
of the yo-yo  would have pushed the funds rate 240 basis points below 
the  DRI  baseline,  which  translates  into  a nominal  funds  rate of  1.3 
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Consequences  of Deficit Reduction 
As I said earlier, perhaps the most interesting and provocative  part of 
the Nordhaus paper is his estimate of the surprisingly large losses  from 
terms of trade effects and the long delay in reaping the apparently small 
benefits of an increase in national saving. Nordhaus is correct to empha- 
size the fact that for a large country like the United States,  the payoff to 
an increase  in national saving is likely to be significantly delayed  (and 
possibly  reduced,  even  in the long run) by interactions  with the world 
eonomy.  A substantial fraction of the rise in national saving will initially 
show up not as an increase  in domestic  investment  but as a rise in net 
foreign investment.  That will reduce the net return from the new saving 
in one certain way and one possible  way. The rise in net foreign invest- 
ment will certainly require, at least for a while,  a reduction in the na- 
tion's terms of trade. And if the reduced inflow of foreign capital is mod- 
eled primarily as a decrease  in the outflow  of American fixed income 
obligations, the real return to the economy will be a good bit smaller than 
the return to an increase in the stock of domestic capital. 
But to evaluate the seriousness  of the problem, we need to see what's 
inside the black box. From Nordhaus's  table 2, for example we see that 
the DRI model,  in the coordination case,  produces a rise in net exports 
equal to 54 percent of the gain in total investment  (net exports plus total 
private domestic  investment).  And in the simulation with the reaction 
function,  the share of net exports  in the total is 65 percent.  For a ten- 
year period, both of these  seem somewhat  high (but probably lie at the 
upper end of a reasonable range). Another question arises with respect 
to the assumptions used in the model about the rate of return to changes 
in net foreign investment.  A widely  used rule of thumb is that the real 
return to private business  investment  is 10 percent. What does the DRI 
model assume about the marginal return to net foreign investment?  If it 
mainly consists  of the return to fixed income obligations,  shouldn't we 
make an adjustment for risk? In his later section on immiserating saving, 
Nordhaus assumes a S percent real return. With an assumed rate of time 
preference  also equal to 5 percent,  it doesn't  take much of a terms of 
trade loss to make deficit reduction a losing proposition.  But is 5 percent 
the right rate to use? We also know that the terms of trade losses  will 
eventually  be converted  to gains, as the inflow of income from abroad 
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sumptions?  Many of the  same kind of  questions  arise in interpreting 
Nordhaus's  longer-term  simulations  using  MULTIMOD  and McKib- 
bin-Sachs models. 
To the extent that Nordhaus's  pessimistic  evaluations  are correct, it 
carries the implication that the country would have gained by staying on 
the old deficit path. Yet, figure 13 shows that under the old deficit path 
the ratio of federal debt to GDP would be increasing steadily (by about 
0.16 decade coming). Thus, the gain from running higher deficits would 
ultimately have been unsustainable.  The meaning of immiserating sav- 
ing ought to be interpreted in that light. 
Finally, if the Nordhaus-DRI conclusions  are essentially  correct, one 
is led to the proposition that it would make eminent good sense: (i) to use 
investment tax credits or other devices  to channel most of the increased 
national saving resulting from deficit reduction into domestic  business 
investment; and (ii) to increase public investments wherever hard analy- 
sis (rather than wishful thinking) shows the payoffs to be substantial. We 
would thereby not only increase the rate of return to society  but avoid 
some of the terms of trade losses. 
Stanley  Fischer:  Traditionally,  William Nordhaus  identifies the brand 
or vintage of any paper that he discusses.  Anticipating this paper, one 
could have expected  an early technical Nordhaus,  the 1969 vintage, or a 
1975 nuclear Nordhaus  of backstop  technologies,  or a whimsical  mod- 
ern Nordhaus of the history of light, or even a cheerful  1994 Nordhaus 
of the joys  of global warming. 
However,  what we have here is a well-written,  extremely  thorough, 
1975 Nordhaus,  "The  Post-Game  Theory  Prerational  Expectations 
Macro Vintage," on the surprising benefits of fiscal and monetary policy 
coordination. The basic argument is that many countries are now locked 
in their high budget deficit impasses  because  the fiscal authority is un- 
able to count on sufficiently rapid help from the monetary authority-in 
the form of a timely easing of monetary policy to prevent a recession- 
if it decides  to cut the deficit. This is a highly implausible argument. 
The Argument 
There is nothing wrong with the basic theorem. The proof that coordi- 
nation is better is straightforward. There is a monetary authority and a William D. Nordhaus  207 
fiscal authority. Each has its own tastes. The monetary authority is more 
averse to inflation than is the fiscal authority. The fiscal authority is di- 
rectly concerned  about the budget surplus, but the budget surplus does 
not itself enter the loss function of the monetary authority (the Federal 
Reserve). 
This is a useful assumption  that together with other assumptions  in 
the model  implies that the Federal Reserve's  reaction function  deter- 
mines  the level  of aggregate demand.  Because  tastes  differ, the Nash 
equilibrium produces a bad outcome  with a higher real interest rate and 
a bigger budget deficit than is needed.  As Nordhaus explains,  the fiscal 
authority attempts to lower unemployment  by raising the deficit (in any 
case,  the fiscal authority prefers higher deficits) while the monetary au- 
thority raises interest rates to fight the resultant inflation. 
Nordhaus adduces the well-known  negative relationship between  in- 
flation and central-bank independence in support of the basic model. But 
if the  Nordhaus  model  described  reality,  centrai-bank  independence 
would also be associated with higher unemployment,  an implication that 
is not clearly evident in the data.  ' Nordhaus argues that we would expect 
very little impact of independence  on unemployment  even in his model 
because the unemployment rate, on average, will be close to the natural 
rate.  But  if that is  the  case,  then  surely  the  policy  game  should  be 
multiperiod and not one-shot. 
Going being beyond the basic argument summarized in figures 1 and 
2, Nordhaus allows for lags in the effects  of policy and assumes that the 
Federal Reserve  will change  policy  only  after the fiscal authority has 
acted. Then a fiscal contraction may indeed lead to a large loss of output, 
because  given the lags in the effects  of monetary policy it takes time to 
return the economy  to full employment. 
The empirical importance of the output loss identified by the theory 
cannot be measured ex ante. To assess  the validity of the model, Nord- 
haus runs vector autoregressions  that enable him to argue that monetary 
policy  has not in the past reacted  to anticipated fiscal policy,  that the 
federal-funds rate reacts slowly to inflation and unemployment,  and that 
fiscal policy has been essentially  exogenous. 
In addition, he uses three structural models to examine the potential 
effects of policy coordination.  It is good to see structural models coming 
1.  The evidence  on this issue is not clearcut because the natural unemployment rate in 
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back. It is hard to know how to do policy analysis without them, but the 
paper also reveals some of the problems with these models, namely, that 
the economic  mechanisms  in them are not transparent and that in these 
cases the lags of policy seem to be extraordinarily long. I was also struck 
by  the  fact  that  the  fiscal  multiplier that Nordhaus  assumes  is  very 
large-namely,  two in his own (estimated-calibrated) model. 
The results of the empirical work are summarized in figures 8-15.  Fig- 
ure  14 makes  Nordhaus's  point most  clearly.  With coordinated  poli- 
cies-in  which monetary policy  becomes  expansionary  in time to pre- 
vent the fiscal contraction from reducing output-there  is a cumulative 
consumption  increase (in the DRI model),  compared with a cumulative 
consumption loss when policy is not coordinated. 
Evaluation 
How seriously should we take these results? At the theoretical level, 
there are three key questions:  first, what would happen if expectations 
were rational; second,  what happens in a multiperiod game; third, what 
would  happen if more forward-looking  elements  were  included  in the 
analysis?2 
On the first question,  the issue is not really rational expectations  but 
whether there is a short-run Phillips curve trade-off. There is, and the 
real issue then becomes whether that trade-off is sufficiently slow to give 
this analysis any validity.  I believe  the answer is yes,  that in individual 
episodes  whether monetary policy  accommodates  a fiscal contraction 
does have real effects.  Second,  in the multiperiod version of the game, 
there would be much more attention to the cumulative effects  of fiscal 
expansion  on inflation. 
It is the absence  of forward-looking elements  in the model that must 
influence the results most heavily.  One does not have to go all the way 
to Ricardian equivalence  to recognize that consumers and investors are 
aware of the government  budget constraint and that a policy  decision 
that resolves  uncertainty by putting fiscal policy back on a sustainable 
2.  The model also lacks an intertemporal budget constraint. If the interest rate exceeds 
the growth rate, then the transversality condition implies that a deficit has to be dealt with 
at some time, an element that is missing from the model.  However,  it would still be best 
dealt with if a monetary expansion offsets the fiscal contraction,  no matter when the fiscal 
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path may have very different implications for consumption  and invest- 
ment than the Keynesian  models in this paper. 
Francesco  Giavazzi  and Marco Pagano have  studied two big fiscal 
contractions  in Europe  that led to  demand expansions.3  These  fiscal 
contractions  took place in small countries,  Ireland and Denmark. They 
led to demand expansions  mainly because  they increased consumption, 
presumably because  individuals were relieved of the uncertainty of not 
knowing how they would be taxed to pay for the deficits in future. 
However,  the biggest problem I have in assessing  the relevance of the 
Nordhaus results is in judging whether the monetary and fiscal authori- 
ties are on the contract curve.  Here is Federal Reserve  Chairman Alan 
Greenspan testifying to the Joint Economic  Committee of the Congress 
in 1990, when the Bush tax increase was being debated: 
The participants  in the budget  summit  are endeavoring  to craft  a package  of siz- 
able deficit  reductions.  If they succeed and  the Congress  does enact a credible, 
long term, enforceable  budget agreement, I would expect long term interest 
rates  to decline.4 
In that context, I would presume  that the Federal  Reserve would move to- 
ward  ease to accommodate  those changes in the capital  markets.  What  adjust- 
ment might  be necessary, and how it might  be timed, cannot  be spelled out be- 
fore the fact. The actions  required  will depend  on current  economic  conditions, 
the nature  and magnitude  of the fiscal package, and the likely timing  of its ef- 
fects. 
What is going on here? According  to the Nordhaus  view,  this is the 
monetary authority's reaction function, and the chairman is testifying in 
a way that will take the economy  to the Nash equilibrium. More plausi- 
bly, I believe,  this should be interpreted as a negotiation between  two 
groups,  Congress  and the Federal Reserve,  that are trying to reach a 
point  on  the  contract  curve.  Of  course,  Nordhaus  might  say  that 
Greenspan's  statement  that the  Federal  Reserve's  actions  cannot  be 
spelled out in advance only proves the validity of the model's  assump- 
tion that there are substantial lags in the response of monetary policy to 
fiscal contraction.  The other view is that those  statements are just part 
of the bargaining. 
Surely  in  1993, the  Federal  Reserve  and the  administration did it 
about right. Or so any reader of The Agenda'  would have to think. I thus 
3.  Giavazzi and Pagano (1990). 
4.  U.S.  Joint Economic  Committee (1991). 
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do not understand why Nordhaus  chooses  the Clinton tax increase  as 
an example in his favor. If the argument supports his view,  it would be 
because  that was a case of cooperation  that illustrates how well policy 
can work when it is coordinated. 
Of course,  one could argue that there are such long lags in the mone- 
tary policy process that the Federal Reserve should have moved sooner. 
But it took a good long while for the tax package to work its way to Con- 
gress and longer yet to come into effect.  So at least in this case the lags 
were not important. 
Concluding  Comments 
Let me conclude with three comments.  One relates to the significance 
of adminstration (and congressional)  rhetoric  in favor of low  interest 
rates. As Nordhaus points out, administrations favor low interest rates. 
What should we make of that? That seems  to be nothing more than a 
statement of ceteris paribus preferences,  precisely along the lines of the 
administration preference function in the Nordhaus model. There is no 
good political reason for an administration to express  a preference  for 
higher rather than lower  interest  rates.  That does  not imply anything 
much about whether a clever politician in the White House might prefer 
higher rates now, which will prolong the recovery,  to lower rates, which 
will result in a recession just before the next election. 
Second,  is it really the absence  of the assurance of supporting mone- 
tary policy that is keeping deficits high around the world? Or is it rather 
the direct political pain that results from raising taxes and cutting spend- 
ing? The outcome of the 1993 fiscal-monetary maneuver, which had en- 
tirely favorable  economic  effects  and no discernible  political benefits, 
suggests that fiscal adjustment per se is what keeps politicians from deal- 
ing with the deficit. 
Third, would we really want fiscal and monetary policy coordinated 
by  putting them in the  same  organization?  In the  United  States  that 
means that either Congress or the Treasury would take responsibility for 
monetary  policy.  Neither  prospect  is  pleasing,  even  though  Milton 
Friedman has on occasion  argued that the Treasury should take over 
monetary policy so that the responsibility will be clearly placed with the 
administration. The evidence  in favor of central-bank independence  is 
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But perhaps the paper is making a more limited point only, that fiscal 
consolidation  is usually contractionary and that, if it is, adverse output 
effects  can be reduced by monetary easing.  That does  not take formal 
coordination, and it has been observed in the United States in recent his- 
tory. So perhaps with intelligent central bankers one can have the bene- 
fits of both central-bank independence  and the degree of coordination 
this paper advises. 
General  Discussion 
Several participants discussed  the fiscal and monetary reaction func- 
tions in the Nordhaus model.  Robert Gordon asked whether the differ- 
ent policy prescriptions of the executive  and the Federal Reserve  came 
because the natural rate of unemployment is estimated differently or be- 
cause one of them rejects the natural rate hypothesis  altogether. He in- 
quired why the party in error would not learn from the observed  evolu- 
tion of inflation, so that the policy prescriptions of the two parties would 
converge over time. William Nordhaus believed that the differences are 
not about estimates  of the natural rate. Rather, they are about perfor- 
mance  over  time horizons  where  policy  can affect  outcomes.  He  ob- 
served that these differences can easily be seen in historical accounts of 
public disagreements  between  the government  and the Fed and noted 
that the executive  especially  cares how well the economy  is doing at the 
time of elections.  Charles Schultze  reemphasized  that even if the fiscal 
authority and the Fed differ over the desired level of aggregate demand, 
the bad equilibrium obtains only if the government believes  that it can 
change aggregate demand by fighting the Fed.  He observed  that politi- 
cians may grumble, but they do not embark on fiscal expansions to offset 
high interest  rates.  Nordhaus  agreed with Schultze's  analytical point, 
but pointed out that Schultze's  equilibrium is not on the contract curve 
and remains inefficient. 
Several discussants  took issue  with the position  that the Fed is for- 
ward looking  rather than merely  focused  on results  already in hand. 
Benjamin Friedman suggested  that, following  an OPEC oil price hike, 
the Fed would not wait to see its effects  on the economy  before taking 
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coordination issue.  For example,  if the Fed is forward looking it will re- 
spond to fiscal policy changes, but this does not necessarily  imply policy 
coordination.  Daniel  Sichel  observed  that the Fed devotes  substantial 
resources  to forecasting  and would certainly characterize  itself as for- 
ward looking. Moreover,  recent Fed actions-such  as its reaction to the 
1987 stock market crash and the 1994 increase of interest rates-indicate 
that it is willing to act before it sees  adverse  movements  in unemploy- 
ment or inflation. Sichel also cautioned that Nordhaus's estimates of the 
Fed's responsiveness  might be biased because the Fed's actual reaction 
function is not easily modeled.  Instead of responding marginally to each 
change in the economy,  the Fed typically acts when a key variable-like 
inflation-crosses  a threshold, which itself changes over time. 
Nordhaus  offered two responses.  First,  the Fed might desire  to be 
forward looking, but the question is whether it can actually act that way 
with all the bureaucratic and political constraints.  For example,  Chair- 
man Greenspan implied that the Fed could not comment ahead of time 
on how it would react to the 1990 budget accord. More generally, Nord- 
haus argued that when it comes to offsetting changes in fiscal policy the 
Fed does "too little too late" to be considered forward looking. Second, 
estimates  of the Fed's  reaction function  show  long lags of unemploy- 
ment and inflation, Schultze's  comment notwithstanding.  Nordhaus ac- 
knowledged  that there might be biases  in estimates  of reaction  func- 
tions,  but table 1 shows  that lags are long for all specifications  and are 
even longer in VAR estimates. 
The discussion  turned to the role of exchange  rate changes  in pro- 
ducing immiserizing saving, which Gregory Mankiw related to optimal 
tariff analysis.  Under certain circumstances,  a tariff can be an optimal 
policy in a large open economy because it can improve the terms of trade 
by shifting the demand curve for foreign goods.  Similarly, immiserizing 
saving arises as purchases of foreign assets increase the supply of dollars 
on the world market, worsening the terms of trade. This effect could be 
offset with taxes or capital controls that reduce the demand for foreign 
assets.  Mankiw believed,  however,  that the negative terms of trade ef- 
fect of foreign investment is likely to be small, and thus believed the pos- 
sibility of immiserizing saving has little policy significance. 
Friedman reasoned that the overall welfare effect of policies designed 
to increase potential GNP has to be evaluated over very long time hori- 
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agreed that immiserizing saving is analytically similar to the question of 
terms of trade tariffs but demurred on Mankiw's  quantitative conclu- 
sion,  arguing that the answer depended  on the elasticities  and rates of 
return. 
Ralph  Bryant  highlighted  the  practical  problem  for  coordination 
raised by the fact that fiscal policy affects the economy faster than mone- 
tary policy.  He suggested that fiscal actions have their biggest effects in 
the initial quarters, while the mean lag of the effects of a monetary action 
is 12 to 15 months. Even if the Fed responds immediately,  it will not be 
able to offset the short-run effects of a fiscal contraction. Gordon did not 
find this timing problem important for long-run analysis,  since short-run 
contractions  would  be  quickly  reversed.  However,  Barry Bosworth 
noted that these short-run contractions are recessions  to the public and 
politicians  and that avoiding them was an important issue in the fiscal- 
monetary game that Nordhaus modeled. 
Bosworth questioned the use of the 1993 budget episode  as an exam- 
ple of a fiscal-monetary game. He reasoned that much of the monetary 
stimulus offsetting the fiscal contraction did not reflect explicit Fed ac- 
tion, but rather came from a drop in long-term interest rates as private 
actors adjusted their expectations  of the deficit. Although monetary ac- 
tion  through  1992 helped  to  offset  the  subsequent  fiscal  contraction, 
these earlier cuts in interest rates were a response  to a recession  rather 
than to future fiscal constraint. 214  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1994 
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